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You Help Me, He Helps You:  
Dispute Systems Design in the Sharing Economy
†
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
 
Imagine the life of Dave, who owns a small computer 
programming business you represent. Every morning, Dave makes 
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create or improve conflict management systems. For instance, HNMCP might assist a co-op 
housing organization to hold internal facilitated dialogues to determine a better approach for 
managing conflict within the co-op. To do so, HNMCP students might conduct a conflict 
assessment through interviews with stakeholders, develop an internal dialogue process, and 
facilitate that process. For more information about HNMCP, see HARVARD NEGOTIATION AND 
MEDIATION CLINICAL PROGRAM, Projects & Clients, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/ 
projects-clients/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2015). SEMs may work with transactional lawyers (such 
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student advocates may also partner with HNMCP to address the organization’s dispute systems 
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his family omelets using the organic vegetables and eggs he receives 
through his weekly farm share.
1
 On this morning, while his three 
children eat, Dave uses a cell phone app to summon a person just 
down the street who is willing, for a fee, to drive Dave and his 
children
2
 to a home across town where the children will receive free 
childcare as a result of Dave’s “banking” eight hours of time in the 
local TimeBank.
3
 After the kids are settled in with the childcare 
provider, Dave finds a nearby bike-sharing station
4
 and rides a 
bicycle to his co-working space
5
 where five independent technology 
 
 1. A “farm share,” or community-supported agriculture (CSA), involves a consumer 
giving money to a farmer in the spring, providing the necessary influx of capital for the farmer 
to purchase supplies and prepare the crops. In exchange, the consumer receives a share of 
whatever the farm produces throughout the summer and fall. Some CSAs take this quite 
literally; they will give the consumer a portion of what is produced (which could be more or 
less than the week before) rather than give the consumer a full box. However, as CSAs have 
surged in popularity over the last decade and consumer expectations of CSAs increasingly 
mirror consumer demands for food items more generally, most CSAs reduce the consumer’s 
actual investment risk by, for example, purchasing from other farms when necessary so that the 
consumer still receives a consistent amount and diversity of produce. See U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., 
ALTERNATIVE FARMING SYSTEMS INFORMATION CENTER, COMMUNITY SUPPORTED 
AGRICULTURE, http://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/pubs/csa/csa.shtml (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).  
 2. Uber, along with competitors Lyft and Sidecar, link individuals who own cars to 
individuals who wish to be driven from one location to another for a fee. The company treats 
the drivers as independent contractors; allows them to set their own hours; and maintains a 
mobile application through which a rider can request a pick-up at a particular location, a driver 
can accept the request, and the rider can pay for the service. Riders and drivers also leave 
reviews of one another through the mobile application. Uber then pays the driver regularly, 
based on the number, length, and type of rides provided. UBER, http://www.uber.com (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 3. Time banks are informal groups of people who offer skills by the hour. Every hour is 
equal to the next, whether someone offers dental services, home repair, massage therapy, guitar 
lessons, or other services. When a user “banks” time by giving another user an hour (or more) 
of service, the user can then “spend” that banked time on services rendered by another user. The 
primary example of this is TimeBanks USA. See TIMEBANKS, http://timebanks.org (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2015).  
 4. Bikesharing companies install multi-bicycle stations in public spaces and charge an 
annual membership fee or a per-use fee to users, who can ride the bicycles one way or 
roundtrip. See, e.g., Cities, BIKESHARE, http://bikeshare.com/map (last visited Oct. 23, 2014).  
 5. Co-working spaces exist in many major cities and offer users a work environment, 
often with meeting space, conference phones, printing services, wireless internet, and other 
amenities for a fee. Co-working spaces may also offer users business development or 
networking events. Though many co-working spaces are owned by an entity or a few 
individuals, some co-working spaces are owned by a collective. Kerry Miller, Where the 
Coffeeshop Meets the Cubicle, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 26, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/ 
stories/2007-02-26/where-the-coffee-shop-meets-the-cubiclebusinessweek-business-news-stock-
market-and-financial-advice. 
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firms share space and office resources. In the refreshments room, 
Dave makes a pot of coffee and grabs a granola bar, the latter of 
which is made by a small-batch baker who works out of a 
commissary kitchen down the street.
6
 During his lunch break, Dave 
rents a designer tuxedo online at a significant discount for an 
upcoming fundraising event
7
 and receives an email from a friend 
asking him to contribute money to her thirty-day online campaign to 
fund her latest documentary.
8
 On his way home from work, Dave 
stops at the food co-op, where he picks up his annual return check 
and a few things for dinner.
9
 That evening, Dave and his husband 
book a guest room in someone’s home a few hours’ north of town for 
a weekend away from the kids.
10
  
Sound like an issue-spotting law school exam? Welcome to the 
so-called “sharing economy.”
11
 The sharing economy
12
 exists at the 
 
 6. Commissary kitchens are commercial kitchens that meet local health and food safety 
codes and offer users commercial-grade kitchen equipment, often including short-term food 
storage and packaging facilities. Users, mostly small-scale food entrepreneurs who cannot 
afford or do not need a commercial kitchen of their own, usually sign up to use the space during 
certain periods each week, and overlapping use of the space (e.g., one food entrepreneur is 
baking while another is prepping food for a catering event) is common. COMMUNITY 
ENTERPRISE PROJECT OF THE HARVARD TRANSACTIONAL LAW CLINICS, FOOD TRUCK LEGAL 
TOOLKIT 12 (Fall 2013), http://www.cityofboston.gov/images_documents/Food%20Truck%20 
Legal%20Toolkit%20PDF%2012.18.13_tcm3-43273.PDF [hereinafter COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE 
PROJECT]. 
 7. See How It Works, RENT THE RUNWAY, https://www.renttherunway.com/how_it_ 
works (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). The company allows users to rent high-end fashion for a 
fraction of the cost of ownership. Id. 
 8. See KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 9. See COOP DIRECTORY SERVICE, http://www.coopdirectory.org/ (last visited Oct. 23, 
2014). 
 10. See AIRBNB, http://www.airbnb.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2015); HOMEAWAY, 
http://www.homeaway.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2015).  
 11. The “sharing economy” is known by many other names, including the “new 
economy,” “collaborative consumption,” “access economy,” “peer-to-peer (or P2P) economy,” 
“cooperative economy,” and “relationship economy,” among others. See Rachel Botsman, The 
Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, CO.EXIST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.fastco 
exist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shared-definition#4; Jenny Kassan & Janelle 
Orsi, The Legal Landscape of the Sharing Economy, 27 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 1, 2, 5 (2012) 
[hereinafter Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape].  
 12. Because of some of the challenges sharing economy models face in defining 
relationships between owners and/or participants, sharing economy entity types vary 
considerably more than more traditional consumer economic structures. Thus, throughout this 
Article, we use “models” rather than “entities” intentionally, as we intend to include the myriad 
of business structures or unincorporated groups of people that make up the sharing economy, 
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intersection of rapidly-developing technology that connects people to 
a plethora of previously inaccessible resources and a growing call for 
less global, more localized, consumption.
13
 Broadly speaking, models 
at this intersection help individuals and entities maximize the benefits 
of ownership by leveraging a valuable good or service into an 
ongoing resource generator (or at least not a resource waster) while 
also providing a benefit—typically, easy access to a good or service 
at a lower-than-market rate for use, often as an alternative to 
ownership
14
—to the non-owner.
15
 
There are myriad benefits to the emergence of the sharing 
economy, or collaborative consumption models (CCMs), in society. 
Broadly speaking, CCMs help society think more creatively about 
“expanding the pie,” or finding ways to generate value, whether 
monetary or otherwise,
16
 from a seemingly finite object or service.
17
 
 
including but not limited to for-profit companies, not-for-profit organizations, hybrid 
organizations such as benefit corporations and L3Cs, and cooperatives.  
 13. JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY (2012) [hereinafter 
ORSI, PRACTICING LAW]; see Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11, at 4 (“The 
reality is that we have already used the planet’s resources faster than they can be replenished, 
and we have built our current economic system by creating an ever-widening gap between the 
rich and the poor. That means that the new economy that we build must not just be sustainable, 
it must now regenerate the economic and ecological abundance necessary for everyone to 
thrive again.”). Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11, at 4. 
 14. We intentionally use non-monetary terms like “resource” and “rate,” as some SEMs 
do not use money as the currency in the relationship. 
 15. Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11, at 3–5; ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, 
supra note 13, at 4–10. See also Yoachi Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Good and the 
Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 275 (2004) 
(stating that “social sharing” joins traditional marketplaces and the state as a third mode of 
organizing economic production). 
 16. At least one commentator argues that traditional consumer companies should follow 
this example and measure value in units used rather than units sold. Alexandra Samuel, 
Established Companies, Get Ready for the Collaborative Economy, HARVARD BUS. REV. (Mar. 
4, 2014), http://blogs.hbr.org/2014/03/established-companies-get-ready-for-the-collaborative-
economy.  
 17. Creating value, or “inventing options for mutual gains,” is also a key concept in 
interest-based negotiation, our approach to conflict management that will form the basis of 
many of our dispute systems design recommendations. See generally ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM 
URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES 58–81 (3d ed. 2011). 
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As a result of these newfound opportunities for value creation, local 
communities can thrive, even in the midst of recessions.
18
  
On an individual level, CCMs give many people access to goods 
they could not otherwise afford to own outright, thus redefining 
“capital” and expanding the availability of capital in societies facing 
increasing economic disparity.
19
 At times, the mere availability of 
these marketplaces encourages potential participants to leverage their 
own skills or possessions—or access the skills or possessions of 
others—in ways they might not have otherwise considered. Linda, a 
TimeBank
20
 member in Louisville, Kentucky, uses her banked time 
to “pay” for chiropractic services and states, “I don’t have money to 
go to a chiropractor . . . [but] I feel wealthy since I’ve been in the 
TimeBank, [even though] I don’t have cash.”
21
 When access is more 
highly valued than ownership, class distinctions and hierarchical 
organizational structures become less powerful means to achieve 
ends.  
CCMs can benefit the environment as well, as a shift away from 
exclusive ownership reduces the number of resource-intensive 
consumer items in production and use.
22
 Overall, CCMs can help 
individuals and communities build lifestyles in which their 
possessions, methods of work, and sources of income are more 
aligned with their values.
23
 These types of paradigm shifts provoke 
headlines as dramatic as “The Sharing Economy: A Whole New Way 
 
 18. Diane Sawyer’s Hometown in Kentucky Saves Money by Helping Each Other Out, 
(ABCNews television broadcast Jan. 16, 2014), available at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/ 
video/diane-sawyers-hometown-kentucky-saves-money-helping-21550025. 
 19. Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11, at 4; ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra 
note 13, at 6, 9–10. 
 20. See supra note 3. 
 21. See supra note 18. 
 22. Laurie Ristrino, Back to the New: Millenials and the Sustainable Food Movement, 15 
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (2013) (discussing how sharing economies have impacted agriculture, 
and particularly the sustainable food movement). 
 23. See generally Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11; ORSI, PRACTICING 
LAW, supra note 13, at 2–4. 
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of Living”
24
 and “Why the Collaborative Economy is Changing 
Everything.”
25
  
A skeptic may assume that CCMs are short-lived consumer over-
reactions in a post-recession economy. If so, the horror story disputes 
we increasingly associate with some of these models—deaths,
26
 
prostitution,
27
 illegal hotels,
28
 mass labor strikes
29
—will prompt a 
pendulum swing back to a preference for top-down, highly regulated, 
corporate-seller-meets-individual-buyer ways of doing business. 
However, economists and others who have studied this rapid shift 
contend that these new, post-recession economic models are here to 
stay.
30
 As a result, while some traditional businesses
31
 and 
governments
32
 are fighting against the rise of CCMs, other 
corporations and even some government entities
33
 are choosing to 
 
 24. James Silver, The Sharing Economy: A Whole New Way of Living, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/04/internet-technology-fon-taskrabbit 
-blablacar.  
 25. Jacob Morgan, Why the Collaborative Economy is Changing Everything, FORBES 
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/10/16/why-the-collaborative-
economy-is-changing-everything/.  
 26. Jessica Kwong, Uber Driver in Fatal Collision Told Police he was Waiting for Fare, 
S. F. EXAM’R (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/uber-driver-arrested-for-
vehicular-manslaughter-in-girls-death/Content?oid=2664123.  
 27. JP Mangalindan, Is Airbnb’s Latest Set Back Bad for the Sharing Economy? FORTUNE 
(Apr. 21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/04/21/is-airbnbs-latest-setback-bad-for-the-sharing-
economy/.  
 28. See, e.g., N.Y. ATT’Y GENERAL, AIRBNB IN THE CITY 2 (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf [hereinafter NYAG]. 
 29. Mark Tran, Taxi Cabs in European Cities Strike Over Uber—As It Happened, 
GUARDIAN (June 11, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/jun/11/taxi-drivers-strike-
uber-london-live-updates.  
 30. Noted economist and author Jeremy Rifkin was recently quoted as saying, “[The 
sharing economy] is the first new economic system to emerge since the advent of socialism and 
capitalism in the 19th century. It’s already transforming economic life, and it’s going to change 
every aspect of our lives dramatically for the next few years.” Kim Lyons, The “Share” 
Economy is Here to Stay, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (July 5, 2014), http://www.post-
gazette.com/business/2014/07/06/The-share-economy-is-here-to-stay/stories/201407060181. 
 31. Id.  
 32. NYAG, supra note 28. 
 33. For example, Hawaii’s House of Representatives recently passed a resolution 
requesting that the State’s Executive Office of Aging complete a study considering timebanking 
as a potential solution to the challenge of providing respite for long-term elder caregivers. H.R. 
60, 2013 Leg., 27th Sess. (Haw. 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/12
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incorporate aspects of the models’ innovative structures or to invest 
in the models outright rather than fight against them.
34
  
Even with all the good that is generated from these alternative 
economic structures, sharing economy models (SEMs) often lack 
dispute resolution structures for managing disputes themselves. As 
CCMs, or at least the disputes arising from them, seem to have 
staying power, attorneys intending to represent CCMs must become 
competent in strategies and tools—both on the pre-dispute side 
(transactional practice) and the post-dispute side (litigation 
practice)—to manage CCM disputes. Most laws that apply to 
businesses were drafted based on traditional economic relationships 
(e.g., buyer/seller, employer/employee); traditional dispute systems 
like courts and legislative action stemmed from these laws. Yet, only 
some CCMs follow these traditional economic relationship structures. 
We will discuss these CCMs in the first section of this Article.  
In contrast, many CCMs, especially smaller, more localized 
CCMs, are based on nuanced, collaborative relationships that do not 
fit traditional, binary, buyer/seller or employer/employee 
relationships. For the purposes of this Article and as described infra, 
we deem these models that do not have clear corollaries in the 
traditional consumer marketplace to be true SEMs. Current laws and 
regulations do not, in the words of dispute resolution pioneer Frank 
Sander, “fit” many innovative SEMs’ operations, let alone their 
“fusses.”
35
 Thus, we endeavor in this Article to distinguish between 
CCMs and SEMs and choose to focus our dispute systems design 
recommendations on SEMs. 
Without laws that appropriately address SEMs’ structures and 
relationships, traditional dispute resolution systems (e.g., court, 
regulatory, or legislative advocacy) and traditional dispute system 
orchestrators (e.g., lawyers) may not be effective means to manage 
the myriad conflicts that arise within SEMs. For example, conflicts 
that arise within SEMs are often hyper-personal and the conflicts may 
 
 34. Timeline: Corporations in the Collaborative Economy, CROWDCOMPANIES, 
http://crowdcompanies.com/blog (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 35. Frank Sander & Stephen Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly 
Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994) [hereinafter Sander & Goldberg, 
Fitting a Forum to the Fuss]. 
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stem from an informal or nonhierarchical arrangement, which render 
these types of conflicts poor candidates for formal means of 
resolution. Such informal relationships may lack a contract, for a few 
reasons. Perhaps the participants did not think they needed a contract, 
or a contract seemed counter to the relationship in question. Perhaps 
the participants believed the types of commitments made among 
participants did not rise to the level of necessitating a legally 
enforceable contract.
36
 Moreover, disputes within SEMs are 
sometimes of relatively low, or no, economic value.
37
 This lack of 
financial incentive to litigate may leave attorneys less inclined to 
become involved with a SEM once a dispute has arisen, let alone 
prior to a dispute. Yet, SEMs’ qualities—relational, access-rather-
than-ownership-driven, value-creating—render SEMs good 
candidates to benefit from attorneys who can help them build 
innovative, tailored, interest-based conflict management systems.
38
  
This Article explores how attorneys can best assist SEMs in 
managing conflicts.
39
 We argue that though the standard practice 
tools on which attorneys already rely to address disputes, including 
standard contract terms and litigation, will still apply to many 
CCMs,
40
 attorneys helping SEMs manage conflict often will need to 
 
 36. See generally Matthew Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract Design, 
14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83 (2008–2009) (discussing self-enforcing contracts).  
 37. We acknowledge that some disputes within SEMs, and especially between SEMs and 
regulatory bodies, can be quite costly in both relative and objective terms. See, e.g., Logan 
Square Kitchen Closing: Chicago Business Shuttered after Feud with City, HUFF. POST (May 
17, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/16/logan-square-kitchen-clos_n_1522458. 
html. Our point here is that most laws and dispute systems designed to resolve disputes within 
the construct of the law are not well-suited to manage the innovative, complex, and sometimes 
low-value (economically), high-value (relationally, psychologically, or otherwise) conflicts that 
may turn into larger disputes.  
 38. See generally NANCY H. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES FOR 
MANAGING DISPUTES 49–68 (2013) [hereinafter ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND 
PROCESSES] (discussing how a designer can take initiative and clarify roles when designing 
dispute systems). 
 39. As law school clinicians and attorneys that support social enterprises ourselves, we 
sense that the core of this Article’s audience is comprised of community-based attorneys who 
are likely to represent community-based SEMs rather than larger, geographically dispersed 
CCMs, and so we will focus our efforts on exploring dispute systems design for those models. 
However, we hope that this Article will be valuable to lawyers who work with CCMs more 
generally, as well. 
 40. The Sustainable Economies Law Center offers many types of “agreements” and 
guidelines for drafting them that parties in a SEM may adopt. JANELLE ORSI & EMILY 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/12
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prepare themselves to build client relationships in new ways; take on 
both familiar (pre-dispute transactional advice) and perhaps not-so-
familiar (pre-dispute systems design) roles within those relationships; 
and use lawyering skills that include, but go far beyond, drafting a 
contract or litigating a case.
41
 Thus, our recommendations advocate 
for attorneys to jump into, rather than shy away from, the innovative 
lawyering that SEMs need to manage conflicts effectively.
42
  
This Article
43
 is comprised of two main sections. In Section I, we 
catalog the various types of CCMs and extricate the commonalities 
and differences that are integral to the development of a body of 
dispute systems design recommendations for SEMs. In doing so, we 
explore current models and draw comparisons between those models 
and traditional marketplace corollaries. By doing so, we can carve out 
from the broader CCM category those models—SEMs—that comport 
with our more narrow understanding of the “true” sharing economy. 
 
DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION 117–34 (2009) [hereinafter ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING 
SOLUTION]. 
 41. Lawyers who represent CCMs must grapple with a body of laws that were designed to 
govern relationships in a competitive economy rather than a collaborative one and thereby 
provoking litigation rather than collaborative problem-solving. Kassan & Orsi, supra note 11, at 
13–14, 19. Thus, attorneys for CCMs must be willing to employ approaches to resolving 
traditional conflicts that are not part of their traditional training. Id. at 17–20 (defining nine 
primary areas in which lawyers who represent sharing economy clients work: drafting 
agreements, entity structure, advising on legalities and taxation of transactions, navigating 
securities laws, navigating employment laws, navigating regulations related to the specific 
production or commerce of the business, managing relationships with real property, managing 
relationships with intellectual property, and managing risk).  
 42. Some readers may contend that some of these models do not sound new at all, but 
rather like a variation on classic capitalism: find a need in the market and create a service or 
good that is more enticing than what currently exists, usually for a cheaper price or for greater 
value. Later in this Article, we will argue that many so-called “sharing economy” models are 
actually market-based solutions that fill gaps in consumer satisfaction, leaving little distinction 
between the sharing economy model and a traditional consumer model. See infra p. 23. Because 
of these similarities, we prefer, and will use throughout this Article, the umbrella term 
“collaborative consumption models” (CCMs) as opposed to “sharing economy models” (SEMs) 
to define the large constellation of businesses in this space.  
 43. We recognize that there are many novel legal issues associated with CCMs, as well as 
many types of disputes that result from CCMs’ existence, including issues related to consumer 
protection, taxation, insurance, and licensing and permitting, among others. For an overview of 
these issues, see Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the 
Sharing Economy, 58 BOS. BAR J. 34 (2014). However, we will be limiting our consideration to 
those disputes resulting from the relationships among participants in SEMs, and will therefore 
not be addressing these other important issues.  
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By distinguishing between CCMs broadly and SEMs in particular, 
and then narrowing our efforts to those disputes that arise within 
SEMs, we can focus our dispute systems design recommendations in 
those areas in which traditional dispute systems are least applicable. 
We conclude Part I by exploring the reasons why these SEMs are 
particularly in need of well-informed and thorough dispute systems 
design.  
In Part II, we share two stories to highlight typical disputes that 
arise within SEMs and how SEMs might address them in the absence 
of dispute systems design. We then explore the common themes of 
these disputes in order to tease out what dispute systems design 
recommendations might be most effective to manage them. Based on 
the disputes and themes therein, we provide practice-based dispute 
systems design recommendations to attorneys who may be tasked 
with mitigating or managing SEM disputes. Note that we do not 
prescribe one type of process, such as mediation, to resolve all 
disputes; we do not believe simply replicating what another SEM has 
done constitutes appropriate dispute systems design. Rather, we 
suggest ways in which attorneys may take design initiative
44
 to assist 
SEMs in creating a system or systems appropriate for the SEMs’ 
particular culture and structure. Specifically, we challenge attorneys 
to think more broadly about the skills they can use—facilitation, 
consensus-building, drafting—to help SEMs develop better conflict 
management systems. 
I. THE UNIVERSE OF COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION 
A. Cataloging the Sharing Economy 
It is difficult to adequately compartmentalize the various models 
of collaborative consumption and their multi-participant, 
consumerism-bending ways. Crowd Companies, a self-described 
brand council for companies wishing to engage the collaborative 
economy, organizes the models based on the good or service being 
leveraged—space, money, tangible goods, food, services, and 
 
 44. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 49. 
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transportation—with “empowered people” in the middle.
45
 Rachel 
Botsman, an author and prominent figure in the modern sharing 
economy movement, categorizes CCMs into three buckets: product 
service systems (systems in which companies or individuals offer 
goods as a service to be used when needed rather than as a product to 
be sold), redistribution markets (markets in which pre-owned goods 
are permanently transferred from somewhere they are not needed or 
wanted to somewhere where they are), and collaborative lifestyles 
(systems in which people with similar needs or interests band 
together to share and exchange assets such as time, space, skills, and 
money).
46
 While these categorizations are useful, it is worth noting 
that both methods of categorization differentiate between the various 
models based on the utility and treatment of the product involved.  
For the purpose of this Article, we have chosen instead to 
categorize CCMs based on the relationships shared between 
participants. These relationships are often foundational to the way 
disputes in CCMs arise and are subsequently resolved. Through this 
lens, we see three main categories of collaborative consumption: two-
sided marketplaces, investment projects, and borrowing enterprises, 
with the last category containing three sub-types of relationships, two 
of which comprise what we consider true SEMs and form the basis 
for our dispute systems design recommendations.
47
  
1. Two-Sided Marketplaces 
Two-sided marketplaces facilitate a connection, often via an 
online platform, between product providers and consumers. 
Sometimes, the product provider actually sells the item to the 
consumer outright, meaning that ownership of the product changes 
hands. Etsy,
48
 an online marketplace for creators and consumers to 
 
 45. Collaborative Economy Honeycomb, CROWD COMPANIES (May 2014), http://www. 
web-strategist.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/honeycomb_collab_econ.jpg (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2014). 
 46. Tomio Geron, How Sharing and Renting is Creating a New Economy in the West, 
FORBES INDIA (Feb. 16, 2013), http://forbesindia.com/printcontent/34711.  
 47. Of course, there are likely “sharing economy” models that will not fit into these 
categories.  
 48. ETSY, http://www.etsy.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
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connect to buy and sell goods, and Listia,
49
 an online marketplace in 
which owners of unwanted goods connect and trade goods with one 
another for points that can be redeemed for other goods on the site, 
are two examples. In other two-sided marketplaces, however, the 
product or service provider retains ownership and merely licenses the 
product to the consumer. Uber and AirBnb are examples of such two-
sided marketplaces for goods, and TaskRabbit,
50
 a website for task-
oriented service providers and consumers to connect, is such a 
marketplace for services.  
2. Investment Projects 
Investment projects involve individuals or small businesses with 
an idea and many investors who “buy in” to the idea. This type of 
CCM sounds similar to a typical start-up business seeking venture 
capital or other traditional financing, but key features distinguish it as 
a CCM. First, the person or entity seeking investment is often 
(though not always) operating at a small scale.
51
 Second, the idea for 
which funding is sought may not be financially promising or lucrative 
enough to attract sufficient investment from accredited investors,
52
 
and the person or entity seeking investment may not have sufficient 
income, credit, revenue potential, or collateral for a traditional loan.
53
 
The investment project model allows for many people to contribute 
 
 49. LISTIA, http://www.listia.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 50. TASKRABBIT, http://www.taskrabbit.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 51. Chuck Klosterman, Was it Ethical for Zach Braff to Take to Kickstarter?, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 24, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/magazine/was-it-ethical-for-zach-braff-
to-take-to-kickstarter.html?_r=0.  
 52. Investor Bulletin: Accredited Investors, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.investor.gov/news-alerts/investor-bulletins/investor-bulletin-accredited-investors#. 
VE2Nmsmh0ok. 
 53. For example, a young singer-songwriter may work part-time and live with her parents 
to financially support her desire to spend time each week writing and playing music. When the 
singer-songwriter decides to record an album, the costs associated with renting a recording 
studio, as well as hiring a sound engineer, side musicians, and someone to mix and master the 
tracks could reach ten thousand dollars or more. A traditional investor may not consider this to 
be a worthwhile investment, both due to the relatively small amount of money involved (and 
therefore the relatively small amount of profit to be earned) and the lack of financial value 
inherent in the activity; likewise, a bank or other lender may look to the short credit history, 
part-time job, and lack of existing financial and physical assets of the singer-songwriter to 
determine that a business or personal loan would not be worth the risk involved to the lender.  
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relatively small amounts of money to the idea to help bring it to 
fruition. Third, though investors often receive something in return for 
the investment, it is not always money; and unlike traditional 
investment mechanisms, it is almost never equity in the recipient-
business.
54
 An example of an investment project facilitator is 
Kickstarter, a website for investment projects whereby the investor, 
for example, may contribute $20 to a musician who wants to raise 
enough money to rent studio time to record an album.
55
 In return for 
her contribution, the investor may receive .mp3 files of the resulting 
new album from the artist. Another investment project model is 
community-supported agriculture (CSA), in which many people buy 
“shares” of a farm’s crops for a growing season. In return, the 
investors receive portions of whatever the farm produces during that 
season, whether it is a bumper crop or a drought year, in regular (e.g., 
weekly) installments.
56
 
3. Borrowing Enterprises 
Borrowing enterprises are CCMs that are in some ways similar to 
two-sided marketplaces, as both categories involve a party with a 
good or service that they are willing to let others use. However, we 
view borrowing enterprises to be those models in which a product or 
service “owned”
57
 by one person or group of people is used by many 
people, sometimes including the owner. This multi-directional (rather 
than bi-directional) arrangement results in a lower market rate for 
both use and ownership of those goods or services as compared to 
 
 54. This may soon change: Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act 
permits the offer and sale of securities through crowdfunded private offerings. The Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) has since published proposed rules to govern “funding 
portals,” which would connect small businesses with individual investors, though those rules 
have not yet been adopted. Noam Noked, JOBS Act Title III Crowdfunding Moves Closer to 
Reality, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERN. & FIN. REG. (Dec. 6, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/12/06/jobs-act-title-iii-crowdfunding-moves-closer-
to-reality/. 
 55. What is Kickstarter?, https://www.kickstarter.com/hello?ref=footer (last visited Oct. 
23, 2014). 
 56. See U.S. DEPT. AGRIC., supra note 1.  
 57. Though services are not tangible goods capable of being owned, they are in the 
possession of the service provider and therefore “owned” by the provider in this context.  
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exclusive ownership of those goods and services by each user. 
Borrowing enterprises can be further categorized into three sub-
categories of borrowing arrangements: circular borrowing, 
simultaneous borrowing, and piecemeal borrowing.  
Circular borrowing occurs when the participants are borrowing 
and lending goods or services to and from the other participants on an 
as-needed basis. Three examples of circular borrowing CCMs are 
tool lending libraries,
58
 media lending libraries,
59
 and time banks or 
time trade circles.
60
  
In contrast, simultaneous borrowing occurs when all of the CCM 
participants are using the same good concurrently, if not 
simultaneously. Co-working spaces and commissary kitchens are two 
examples of simultaneous borrowing CCMs. 
In the third sub-category of borrowing enterprises, piecemeal 
borrowing enterprises, a person or entity owns a product or service 
and permits other individuals to “borrow” that product or service, one 
at a time. In one sense, piecemeal borrowing enterprises like ZipCar
61
 
are similar to two-sided marketplaces like Etsy: the model consists of 
one-time interactions between a buyer/renter and a seller/owner.  
 
 58. See, e.g., LOCAL TOOLS, http://localtools.org/find/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 59. Chegg was the first company to allow students to rent textbooks instead of purchase 
them outright. See CHEGG, http://www.chegg.com (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 60. See TIMEBANKS, supra note 3. 
 61. ZIPCAR, http://www.zipcar.com (last visited June 10, 2015). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Dispute Systems Design in the Sharing Economy 193 
 
 
 
 
The preceding graphic is not meant to be inclusive of all types of 
CCMs, but rather to outline a general framework for how these 
businesses are structured and to characterize the relationships 
between participants in them. Based on our analysis and for the 
purposes of our recommendations, we consider those CCMs that we 
sub-categorize as circular borrowing enterprises and simultaneous 
borrowing enterprises to be SEMs.
62
 Our reasons for this 
segmentation between CCMs and SEMs are further outlined below. 
 
 62. We acknowledge that our attempts to categorize the universe of collaborative 
consumption are not incontrovertible; simultaneous borrowing enterprises such as co-working 
spaces and commissary kitchens sometimes (though not always) contain clear party distinctions 
between the owners/operators of the space and the participants who rent the space. One 
example is CropCircle Kitchen, Inc., a commissary kitchen and culinary incubator in Boston, 
Massachusetts. As a result, disputes that arise between parties on either side of these relational 
boundaries may be similar to traditional disputes in traditional business relationships, including 
the existence of parties with seemingly unequal bargaining power and the availability of clear 
contractual or precedential remedies to resolve them. However, when considering the close 
working relationships typical of the participants in such SEMs (whether owner/participants or 
otherwise) and the disputes that arise therefrom, simultaneous borrowing enterprises should be 
categorized as SEMs.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
194 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 48:179 
 
 
B. Not All Collaborative Consumption Models Are Shared Economy 
Models 
1. Many CCMs Have Traditional Marketplace Corollaries  
Companies such as Uber, Airbnb, and Task Rabbit have willingly 
and vocally served as poster children of the sharing economy’s “quiet 
revolution.”
63
 Yet from the user’s perspective, these companies 
merely offer improved services in otherwise well-established 
consumer categories. For instance, car sharing companies such as 
Uber, Lyft, and Sidecar look and feel like traditional taxi services, 
with an added layer of technology to streamline the transaction.
64
 
Similar distinctions (or lack thereof) can be drawn between Airbnb 
and traditional business models for temporary lodging. Airbnb may 
offer a more stream-lined, personalized user experience than a 
traditional hotel, encouraging “hosts” to invite guests to dinner, teach 
them something local, or introduce them to their friends.
65
 Yet 
increasingly hotels themselves also offer creative amenities.
66
 These 
“new” models fill a market gap or shortcoming with a slightly 
modified version of an existing traditional consumer model.
67
 On the 
part of the providers of the service or good, the primary motivation 
for providing the service is to make money, while the purchaser of 
that service or good is primarily motivated by the value associated 
 
 63. Sara Horowitz, Occupy Big Business: The Sharing Economy’s Quiet Revolution, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/occupy-big-
business-the-sharing-economys-quiet-revolution/249582/. 
 64. This surprisingly minor distinction is not hidden by the companies themselves. On 
Uber’s website, the company answers the question, “How is Uber different from a standard 
taxi?” by responding, “With Uber, there’s no need to call a dispatcher or hail on the street. You 
can request a ride with the push of a button and track your driver’s progress to your location.” 
How is Uber Different from a Standard Taxi?, UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-
us/articles/201968463-How-is-Uber-different-from-a-standard-taxi- (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 65. Hospitality Standards, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/hospitality (last visited Apr. 
15, 2015). 
 66. See, e.g., Best New Hotel Amenities, FODOR’S TRAVEL, http://www.fodors.com/news/ 
story_4603.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).  
 67. Similar parallels between CCMs being moderate improvements on traditional models 
can be drawn between Zipcar and car rental agencies, Task Rabbit and temporary hiring 
agencies, and Etsy and other online shopping sites. 
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with the service or good relative to its cost.
68
 While two-sided 
marketplaces, investment projects, and piecemeal borrowing 
enterprises are models of collaborative consumption, they are not 
examples of sharing, at least not in the traditional sense of the word.
69
 
By pointing out this mismatch between advertised principles and 
demonstrated principles, we do not intend to disparage these 
companies for offering improved services. Rather, our point is that 
some CCMs claim to promote values like community-building and 
sharing to consumers for the sake of avoiding traditional dispute 
resolution processes. For instance, in framing itself as a sharing 
economy business that merely provides an online platform for car 
owners to use their existing possessions to earn revenue, Uber claims 
it “does not and does not intend to provide transportation services or 
act in any way as a transportation carrier, and has no responsibility or 
liability for any transportation services provided to [the rider]”
70
 and 
therefore, should not be encumbered by the city regulations—
background checks, licenses, penalties, and monitoring—by which 
traditional taxi companies must abide.
71
 Similarly, Nick Ganju, co-
founder of Airbnb, claims that the company simply wants to help 
people “share” their homes with others and thus should not be subject 
to some of cities’ housing authority regulations.
72
  
Yet the faults in these CCMs’ conflict-avoidance-by-label 
approach are coming to the forefront. Recently, Portland, Oregon, 
ordered Uber to cease operations in the city, claiming Uber violated 
 
 68. Jessica Pressler, The Dumbest Person in Your Building is Passing Out Your Keys, 
N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 22, 2014), http://nymag.com/news/features/airbnb-in-new-york-debate-2014-
9/. 
 69. See contra VISION CRITICAL & CROWD COMPANIES, SHARING IS THE NEW BUYING: 
HOW TO WIN IN THE COLLABORATIVE ECONOMY 3 (2014), available at http://www.vision critical. 
com/sites/default/files/pdf/sharing-new-buying-collaborative-economy-report.pdf (describing the 
sharing economy as a “crowd that has become a company unto itself” and proudly touting that 
the “company” has already begun “acting like . . . hotels, taxis, [and] farms.”). 
 70. Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last visited Oct. 
23, 2014). 
 71. See, e.g., Meir Rinde, Uber Tries to Steer Clear of New Rules and Regulations in 
Garden State, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/ 5/04/06/uber-
tries-to-steer-clear-of-new-rules-and-regulations-in-garden-state/.  
 72. David Streitfeld, Airbnb Listings Mostly Illegal, Report Contends, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
15, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/business/airbnb-listings-
mostly-illegal-state-contends.html. 
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Portland City Code 16.40, which requires “Private for-hire 
Transportation” operating in Portland to, among other requirements, 
obtain appropriate insurance and a license to operate.
73
 Though it has 
tried to distance itself from the acts of drivers who use “Uber 
Technologies, Inc.” to coordinate driving services, Uber has been 
subject to lawsuits claiming Uber is liable for violations of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act,
74
 background check regulations 
(after a series of Uber drivers were accused of crimes ranging from 
battery to sexual assault and kidnapping),
75
 and even wrongful 
death.
76
 Similarly, the New York Attorney General
77
 and other 
officials,
78
 contend that Airbnb hides behind its declaration that those 
who list space for rent are simply “sharing” (rather than renting) their 
homes.
79
 Indeed, the relationship between an Airbnb home owner 
and their guest often looks more like a temporary rental than a friend 
crashing on the couch; only a small percentage (less than 28 percent) 
of Airbnb’s revenue in New York City comes from legal, temporary 
 
 73. Letter from Leah Treat, Director, Portland Bureau of Transportation, to Brook Steger, 
General Manager, Uber Inc. (Dec. 8, 2014), available at https://www.portlandoregon.gov/ 
transportation/article/511927. 
 74. One case alleged that some Uber drivers refuse to pick up visually-impaired riders 
with assistance dogs. In response, Uber proclaimed that “any driver partner who refuses to 
transport a service animal will be removed from the service,” yet the complaint states that 
“Uber has failed to notify most of [the people with visual impairments] whether Uber has 
thoroughly investigated their complaints, disciplined the relevant UberX drivers, or taken any 
other meaningful steps to ensure that these drivers do not continue to unlawfully discriminate 
against them or other individuals with service animals. Instead, Uber representatives often 
respond to these complaints by denying responsibility for the discrimination. Meanwhile, many 
of these blind individuals experience ongoing denials from multiple drivers.” Nat’l. Fed. Blind 
v. Uber, No. 3:14-CV-4086 (N.D. Ca. Sept. 9, 2014). 
 75. Keith Wagstaff, Uber’s Wild 2014: Can Protests and Lawsuits Bring it Down?, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/ubers-wild-2014-can-lawsuits 
-protests-bring-it-down-n265536. 
 76. Kale Williams & Kurtis Alexander, Uber Sued in Girl’s Death in S.F., S.F. EXAMINER 
(Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Uber-sued-over-girl-s-death-in-S-F-517 
8921.php. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Craig Garmin, Airbnb to New York Mayor: Tax Our Hosts, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303779504579465532885246114.  
 79. NYAG, supra note 28, at 2. Indeed, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s 
recent report on Airbnb found that 72 percent of rentals on Airbnb violated state law or the New 
York City municipal code. Id. 
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rental arrangements, in which a visitor to a city stays with a host.
80
 In 
contrast, 38 percent of Airbnb’s revenue for 2013 came from units 
that were rented out without the host present for a total of six or more 
months during the year.
81
 By claiming not to be something that it is 
(and by claiming to be something that it is not), Airbnb facilitates tax 
evasion and health and fire code violations.
82
  
For the sharing economy to maximize the benefits it can provide 
to consumers and shift the way consumers currently think about 
goods and services, CCMs should not—and cannot—avoid conflicts 
resulting from their services.
83
 The sharing economy has reached a 
sort of “headache” phase, wherein regulatory crackdowns and 
competition between rival companies spawn dispute-related 
headlines.
84
 Many CCMs have existing dispute systems at their 
disposal that could—and in some cases should—handle disputes that 
arise from doing business. This is not to say that these CCMs 
currently possess fail-safe dispute resolution systems. We 
acknowledge that attorneys who choose to represent CCMs face an 
uncertain legal landscape, especially as CCMs continue to develop 
novel methods of doing business
85
 and face increasing scrutiny by 
government entities.
86
 But at least for now, two-sided marketplaces 
 
 80. Id. at 8. 
 81. Id. at 13. 
 82. Id. at 9, 14, App. A, B. A recent unpublished working paper claims Airbnb’s structure 
perpetuates discriminatory housing practices. Benjamin Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital 
Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com (Harv. Bus. School Working Paper, Working Paper 
No. 14-054, 2014), available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-054_ 
e3c04a43-c0cf-4ed8-91bf-cb0ea4ba59c6.pdf. 
 83. Joe Mathews, The Sharing Economy Boom is About to Bust, TIME (June 27, 2014), 
http://time.com/2924778/airbnb-uber-sharing-economy/ 
 84. Wingham Rowan, A Sharing Economy Cliffhanger: What Will Governments Do? 
STAN. SOC. INNOV. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/a_sharing_ 
economy_cliffhanger_what_will_governments._DO. 
 85. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 
256 (2013-2014) (stating that the myriad areas of law that apply to social enterprises must often 
be applied to novel situations, citing the application of tax law to the business model of Panera 
Cares, which allows customers to pay a donation price for meals and results in some free meals 
for those customers who are unable to pay).  
 86. The Sustainable Economies Law Center facilitates proactive advocacy on behalf of the 
sharing economy by creating model city policies and highlighting laws and regulations that may 
impact sharing economies. Advocacy, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES L. CENTER, http://www. 
theselc.org/advocacy (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). This is a good model for CCMs to follow; if 
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and the attorneys who represent them have pre-existing, even if non-
ideal,
87
 avenues—traditional dispute resolution systems like 
arbitration and litigation triggered in standard insurance policies and 
other contracts—to manage their disputes.
88
  
C. True Sharing Economy Models, and Why the Distinction Matters 
for Dispute Resolution Purposes 
For SEMs, though, there is little precedent for (and few models 
of) dispute systems that fit the forum to the fuss.
89
 Thus, we hope to 
create a framework that will assist SEMs in designing appropriate, 
effective, and just
90
 dispute systems to address conflict that arises in 
such entities. If SEMs lead the way, a secondary benefit to their 
efforts may be that other CCMs will learn from the SEMs’ example 
and thereby be more intentional in their own dispute systems design. 
1. What Was Once Old is New Again  
To us, true SEMs enact “sharing” in the kindergarten sense of the 
word: I may own a toy, but I will let you use it primarily because we 
are in a mutually-beneficial relationship
91
 with one another and not 
because you can give me money for it. As one SEM participant said, 
“We don’t think of [our SEM] like Uber. With them, money is just a 
replacement for community.”
92
 Moreover, if I am not using a 
 
they do not prefer these methods, CCMs should intentionally participate in the design, or 
improvement, of dispute systems appropriate tailored to their actual operations. 
 87. Julie Bort, Airbnb Host: A Guest is Squatting in my Condo and I Can’t get Him to 
Leave, BUS. INSIDER (July 21, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-host-cant-get-
squatter-to-leave-2014-7. 
 88. For instance, Uber states that its “rideshare” drivers are required to carry personal 
insurance (implying, from the company’s perspective, that at least some accidents that occur 
while “ridesharing” would be covered under a personal insurance policy. In the US, what 
Insurance is Available if there’s an Accident?, UBER, https://support.uber.com/hc/en-us/ 
articles/202347808-In-the-US-what-insurance-is-available-if-there-s-an-accident- (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2014). 
 89. Sander & Goldberg, Fitting a Forum to the Fuss, supra note 35.  
 90. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 201–06. 
 91. ROBERT G. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
52–56 (1991) (stating that members of tight-knit groups develop norms designed to maximize 
the aggregate welfare of the group). 
 92. Interview with Anonymous TimeBank User, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 13, 2014). 
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particular object at any given time, letting you use it will provide 
great value to you at a low cost to me, and perhaps open the door to 
you sharing the “excess capacity” of one of your own objects at some 
point in the future.
93
  
Ironically, the true sharing economy and the methods for 
resolving conflicts within it reflect ways of doing business that have 
existed for centuries. The notion of sharing resources as a way to 
increase the value of those resources for everyone has long served as 
the backbone of local economies. I might have “borrowed” a cup of 
sugar from you (never intending to return it); later, I will likely grant 
your request to borrow my lawn mower to finish the job when yours 
runs out of gas. If I have a barn to raise and you are willing to help 
me raise it, I will make sure that you are well fed as we work and I 
will help you raise your barn next year. No written contract is needed 
to ensure these arrangements will be honored, as generosity is 
understood as imposing a debt.
94
 Any disputes that occur around the 
future promise of lawnmower borrowing or barn-raising are handled 
within the community through customs, norms, and social pressure.
95
 
Reputation and trust precipitate sharing and were once—and still are 
in some communities—integral components of survival and 
cornerstones of doing business.
96
   
 
 93. Though we find his economic efficiency and transactional cost arguments too 
simplistic to fully describe why people participate in sharing economies, we find persuasive 
Benkler’s argument that people choose to share for a variety of self-motivated reasons. Yoachi 
Benkler, supra note 15, at 273, 306–10, 313 (citing the world’s fastest supercomputer at the 
time, SETI@home, and the second-largest commuter transportation system in the United States, 
carpooling, as examples of socio-economic systems that rely on sharing rather than a price 
system to distribute resources and categorizing motives for people’s participation in such 
systems, including when the social “return” is higher than the social selective “cost”). 
 94. Id. at 316. 
 95. For an analysis of these types of “social selective exclusions” and the social economic 
considerations in such transactions, see id. at 310, 312–13, 315–16. 
 96. See Jennejohn, supra note 36, at 98 (citing two types of pressure for parties to self-
enforcing agreements to conform: risk of damage to the reputation of a party who intends to 
continue exchanging with others and the incentive to build trust and therefore reduce 
transaction costs involved in the exchange).  
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2. How Today’s Sharing Economy Is Different 
Despite the similarities mentioned above, there are notable 
differences between the sharing economies of yesterday and those 
that are emerging today. First, modern cultures tend to be more 
mobile and transient, leading to evolving definitions of family and 
community. Thus, though reputation is still an integral component of 
doing business,
97
 we often interact with, and rely on, business owners 
and consumers who are not closely-related persons for whom we 
have historical knowledge of their reputation.
98
 As a result, the way 
in which we view and handle preservation and analysis of 
reputation
99
 in sharing economy models should be different.  
Second, there were (and still are) many downsides to relying upon 
informal community norms to dictate the resolution of disputes.
100
 
Community norms often lack the “crispness” of precise terms and 
clearly delineated pathways for resolution. To enforce norms, 
communities often rely on social cues, observation, and storytelling 
about past conflicts rather than written regulations.
101
 While this 
informalism has benefits, it also makes new members’ transitions into 
the community more confusing and can result in ad hoc 
 
 97. See Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a 
Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328, 2335 (2004) (exploring the 
enforcement of private ordering relationships through reputation, and hypothesizing that private 
ordering arises in relationships in which agreements are publicly unenforceable, market 
incentives are important, and legal barriers to entry into the relationship are low).  
 98. Benkler, supra note 15, at 281–88, 287 (describing a precursor to Uber—dynamic 
carpooling—an “entirely impersonal, ad hoc practice with no perceptible socially stable set of 
participants” in which strangers in major US cities share rides based on “loose” group norms). 
 99. Richman, supra note 97 (“Parties benefit from ongoing transactions with their 
colleagues; in each transaction, parties have an opportunity to cheat their counterparts; if a party 
cheats any other party, that party’s misconduct becomes known throughout the community; and 
no one will transact with any individual known to have cheated in the past. Thus, a party’s good 
reputation ensures the opportunity to benefit from future transactions, and inversely, the 
prospect of future beneficial transactions induces cooperative behavior.”). 
 100. Edgardo Buscaglia & Paul B. Stephan, An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of 
Formal Versus Informal Dispute Resolution on Poverty: A Governance-based Approach, 25:1 
INT’L R. LAW ECON. 89, 102–03 (2005). See also Richman, supra note 97, at 2346–47 (stating 
that reputation-based enforcement of community norms results in barriers to entry for 
newcomers into the community and creates the potential for collusive behavior). 
 101. See Benkler, supra note 15, at 318. 
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determinations regarding punishments for violating norms.
102
 For 
instance, who decides what the punishment should be for breaking a 
norm? If left up to the crowd, a mob mentality may result in 
overwrought or even violent consequences. But if left up to only the 
most powerful in the community, the power imbalance may result in 
unjust outcomes.
103
 We observe that today’s SEMs often value 
inclusion of diverse participant perspectives, self-determination,
104
 
and due process more so than previous generations,
105
 and thus 
SEMs’ dispute resolution mechanisms should reflect these values. 
Third, in contrast to eras when sharing economies were always 
local economies, today’s SEMs may benefit from having a global 
reach. Even if the SEM’s activities are purely local, the SEM likely 
presents a public face through a website or social media presence. If 
the SEM does not, its members likely do, and will use their social 
media channels as platforms to air both praise and grievances.
106
 Any 
conflicts that spill into public view risk drawing the attention of 
lawmakers and adding fuel to the argument that these businesses need 
stricter regulation.
107
 SEMs may avoid some regulatory burden if 
they can determine how to anticipate and effectively manage internal 
disputes before they arise.   
 
 102. See Benkler, supra note 15, at 315–17. 
 103. See Buscaglia & Stephan, supra note 100, at 92–93. 
 104. See Richman, supra note 97, at 2339 (stating that relationships governed through 
private ordering, as opposed to public courts and other sources of law, require voluntary 
cooperation by participants in the relationship). 
 105. CATHY A COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 41–48 (1996) (outlining the values inherent in power-based, rights-
based, and interest-based dispute resolution systems and highlighting what values may not be 
preserved in each). 
 106. A media storm was created when grocery co-op members in Park Slope were 
interviewed for a New York Times story about the practice of co-op members sending their 
nannies to work shifts for them. Michael Crewdson, Praise from Afar for the Park Slop Food 
Co-Op, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2011), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/07/praise-from-
afar-for-the-park-slope-food-co-op/. 
 107. Dominic Balsuto, The Sharing Economy: How Do You Stop Something You Can’t 
Keep Up With?, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
innovations/wp/2013/05/24/the-sharing-economy-how-do-you-stop-something-you-cant-keep-
up-with/. 
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3. Why SEMs Need Attorneys with Dispute Systems Design 
Skills 
Today’s SEMs need clear and constructive dispute resolution 
norms, designated and qualified conflict resolvers, and a systematic 
way to ensure that those norms are communicated to new 
members.
108
 As one participant in a shared workspace articulated, a 
SEM “needs to be somewhere where you give away power and 
control and trust that people will take it and do something great with 
it.”
109
 A lack of a framework for healthfully and internally resolving 
disputes threatens to damage relationships among participants and, in 
turn, damage the societal development SEMs promote.  
Though non-attorneys may possess skills useful to this endeavor, 
we choose to direct our recommendations to attorneys for two 
reasons.
110
 First, attorneys possess knowledge of the law and can 
surmise how the law relates to and impacts SEMs, the people within 
them, and the benefits the SEMs seek to provide to their participants 
and communities. SEMs often grapple with the many roles 
participants may play within the SEM. For example, while we may 
characterize the Uber driver/consumer relationship with respect to the 
ways it parallels the taxi driver/consumer relationship, the roles of 
participants in a cooperative housing arrangement, in which a person 
may be both a joint owner and a current user of a common space, are 
more amorphous. Likewise, a tool library may have multiple users 
who each own different tools, but all of the users have access to the 
entire library.  
In addition to the fluid distinctions between the parties involved, 
other traditional contractual constructs, such as offer and acceptance, 
are not as intuitively applied to SEMs. For example, a TimeBank 
may offer you the opportunity to benefit from a member’s plumbing 
 
 108. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 233–39 
(discussing ways in which a designer can encourage more constructive interactions among 
stakeholders through creating and ensuring communication of shared goals and norms).  
 109. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Co-Working Space User (Sept. 28, 2014).  
 110. See ROBERT MNOOKIN, SCOTT R. PEPPET & ANDREW TULUMELLO, BEYOND 
WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 184, Part I (2004). A 
tertiary, but not insignificant, reason is that the bulk of this Article’s readership will likely be 
attorneys.  
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skills while you may choose to reciprocate by giving an hour of pie-
baking services to a different member. Moreover, the currency used 
for consideration within SEMs is often not financial, creating a world 
in which “equality” of goods and services is much more challenging 
to evaluate. Another challenge is that legal liability may exist without 
anyone identifying it as such. One co-working space member 
mentioned that the space was often used in the evening for non-work-
related events. Though none of the members anticipated problems 
with this after-hours usage, the members were taking on liability for 
what occurred in the evenings.
111
 Non-attorneys may have a more 
difficult time determining the rights, responsibilities, and remedies 
that touch each of these circumstances unique to SEMs. 
Second, we believe the role of attorneys in society is to help 
resolve disputes in the way that best serves their clients. 
Unfortunately, many SEM participants to whom we spoke believed 
that attorneys were best kept out of situations, because when the 
attorneys showed up, conflict became even messier.
112
 It seems like 
the attorneys involved did not understand the impact their approach 
had on their actual ability to assist SEMs. By exploring innovative 
ways of supporting SEMs, attorneys can match their intention to 
assist with a method that has a helpful impact. In turn, clients may be 
able to see the value an attorney can add before a lawsuit occurs.  
II. DISPUTES IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
A. Common Disputes and Existing Solutions 
1. Scenario #1: Circular Borrowing 
“It’s not just about money,” one TimeBank user in Louisville 
claimed, “It’s about real friendships”: friendships that develop as a 
result of the services shared among community members.
113
 Real 
friendships may be a value-add for some TimeBank users, but 
 
 111. Interview with Anonymous Co-Working Space User, supra note 109. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Based on an ABCNews story on timebanking in Louisville, Kentucky. See supra note 
18. 
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friendship is not sufficient to resolve all conflicts. Consider Dave 
taking his children to a fellow TimeBank user (though not a person 
who was previously familiar to him), Cindy, who provides childcare 
for the day. Imagine that Dave receives a call from his eldest child in 
the middle of the day: “Daddy, Cindy says we deserve three cookies 
today for being such good kids. I thought you told us we could only 
have one cookie a day. Jack already had three. Can I, too?” 
Obviously, Cindy has a different standard for children and sweets 
than Dave does, which may in itself create conflict. But what if Cindy 
fed the kids peanut butter cookies and Jack, who had not been 
evaluated for allergies, had an allergic reaction to the peanuts? Or 
what if Cindy refused to feed Jack any cookies because she thought 
he was overweight? 
Perhaps the provider has particular credentials that certify her as 
qualified to care for the ages and number of children Dave has. If so, 
Dave may be able to respond to certain disputes by reporting her 
through a channel of authorities. But the likelihood of Cindy being 
credentialed is seemingly small. Moreover, Dave did not pay Cindy 
money to care for his children, and he cannot take back the hours he 
“banked” to cover the care. Likewise, unless Jack suffered a 
significant medical emergency due to the peanut allergy, both civil 
and criminal litigation are unlikely courses of action. So if Dave 
consented to having Cindy watch his children for the day, and if 
Cindy conducted the service with goodwill, what can Dave do if he 
does not like how she cared for his children? What if he feels like the 
hours he “banked” doing computer programming for other TimeBank 
users were far more valuable than the hours Cindy spent with his 
children?  
TimeBank urges people to understand that “[t]he number of 
decisions to make, the need for planning, and the necessity of record-
keeping can take people by surprise when they start up a 
TimeBank. Best to expect it and be ready for it going in.”
114
 While 
this statement is intended to helpfully alert a user that they should be 
prepared to take additional steps to ensure they get the most benefit 
 
 114. More About Timebanking, TIMEBANKS, http://timebanks.org/more-about-timebanking/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
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from their TimeBank experience, this statement does not tell them 
how to prepare. Likewise, the TimeBank website reminds users that 
local TimeBanks “have policies and information they need to share 
with members,” including policies about “disputes between 
members.” Yet the same policy states that some individual 
TimeBanks may choose to have a policy that says, “[W]e will have 
no policies.”
115
 So while TimeBank asserts that Dave should be 
prepared to handle the above situations, TimeBank also states that the 
local TimeBank may give Dave no assistance in how to prepare or 
handle the situations. Indeed, though many TimeBanks share group 
norms, guidelines, or core values they expect members to uphold,
116
 
most do not provide guidelines for how users—or even TimeBank 
managers—should address, let alone resolve, disputes arising from 
the norms or values.
117
  
2. Scenario #2: Simultaneous Borrowing 
Granola Grit, the small-batch granola bar company from which 
Dave’s shared workspace buys its snacks, operates out of a 
commissary kitchen.
118
 The kitchen is licensed as a commercial 
kitchen and a kitchen manager ensures that users know about health 
codes and other safety regulations. Granola Grit’s owner, Tiffany, 
joined the kitchen two years ago after complaining to a friend, vegan 
chocolate maker and Choco-Love founder Luis, that she could not 
keep up with demand for her granola bars—or with health department 
 
 115. Id.  
 116. About Time Banking, TIME TRADE CIRCLE, http://www.timetradecircle.org/timebank. 
php#corevalues (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 117. In the extensive review of TimeBank guidelines, the authors found only one instance 
of a specific dispute resolution process outlined. See ROYAL OAK TIMEBANK, MEMBER 
HANDBOOK 12 (Oct. 2014), available at http://www.royaloaktimebank.org/Docs/ROTB 
MembershipHandbookfull.pdf. There were a number of instances in which a TimeBank 
recommends negotiation or mediation, but does not provide sufficient specificity for a member 
to actually employ such processes. See, e.g., the TimeBank in Australia requires that TimeBank 
members attempt to resolve the dispute on their own. If they do not resolve the dispute, the 
dispute “may” be referred to an “Administrator” for mediation. No process for doing so, or 
identification of who should do so, is outlined for members. Timebanking, Terms and 
Conditions 17.1, available at http://www.timebanking.com.au/legal.  
 118. This scenario is based on an interview conducted with a commissary kitchen manager. 
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Commissary Kitchen Manager (Aug. 16, 2014). 
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regulations—in her own kitchen. Luis mentioned that he made his 
chocolates at a commissary kitchen in the old warehouse district. He 
invited her to help him make his chocolates so she could see the 
space. Walk-in refrigerators, commercial ovens, tons of equipment, 
and even a labeling machine! She could never afford all of this on her 
own. She put in an application and was accepted to become a 
member of the commissary kitchen.  
Tiffany pays to use the kitchen between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m., when 
she slow roasts the granola and lets it set before cutting and 
packaging it. She is allowed to use whatever equipment she needs, as 
long as someone else hasn’t reserved the equipment first. Sometimes, 
other users will be in the space at the same time, working on a 
different surface or in a different part of the kitchen. She attends the 
quarterly community meetings and has made good friends with many 
of the twenty or so other food entrepreneurs that use the space. She 
has even collaborated with a few, using Choco-Love’s chocolate and 
roasted nuts from The Nutty Bar in her granola bars. 
Another user of the community kitchen, Ralph, operates a 
specialty sausage business. Often, Ralph will bring in unusual cuts of 
meat, grind the meat, and leave the unusable portions in the garbage 
can without emptying it in the dumpster out back. A few users have 
politely asked Ralph to remove his garbage before he leaves. This 
week, Tiffany came into the kitchen at her scheduled time to find the 
counter unclean, the food sink full of soiled plastic wrap, and the 
garbage can full of meat scraps. She spent two of her four hours of 
paid kitchen time cleaning the space before she could begin her work. 
She asked Luis to help her both clean up the mess and confront 
Ralph, but Luis quickly exited, stating that he did not want to get in 
the middle of it. Because of the delay, Tiffany could only make half 
of the bars she normally makes in a week. As a result, Tiffany is so 
angry that she is considering leaving the commissary kitchen 
community altogether, but she desperately needs these commercial 
tools until she can rent or buy a space of her own. 
Problems like the one described above are not out of the ordinary 
in this commissary kitchen. In fact, the kitchen has so many conflicts 
during the warmer months, when kitchen use—and the literal heat in 
the kitchen—are at their highest that the kitchen manager, Maureen, 
has dubbed the last month of summer “Angry August.” Still, there are 
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no formal dispute resolution guidelines for kitchen users, nor a 
system outlined for how and when users should raise issues with the 
community members. Though Maureen eventually hears about most 
conflicts, she is rarely the first to hear about them and by the time she 
is made aware, the conflicts have often escalated to the point where 
users are threatening to leave rather than face potential health code 
violations or further economic loss because of other users. Maureen 
has had to dismiss one user because the user’s behavior was 
jeopardizing the kitchen’s health code status, but other than that, she 
finds most conflicts ultimately resolve (whether amicably or 
otherwise) without her involvement.  
B. Common Themes of Sharing Economy Disputes  
We can draw out a few common themes from these disputes that 
will help us frame dispute systems design recommendations to 
address the interests of SEMs. 
 
 1. Reliance on Trust in a Variety of Relationships 
 
As discussed earlier, participants’ roles in traditional businesses 
are often dichotomous.
119
 In contrast, relationships in SEMs are 
typically much more complex; roles are often overlapping and fluid. 
Sometimes, especially in smaller SEMs, participants have a personal 
relationship with one another prior to entering into a “business” 
relationship together. As in the case of Luis and Tiffany, these 
participants must navigate both a personal and a professional 
relationship, which can be particularly difficult when the lines 
between those relationships begin to blur.
120
 One co-working space 
user explained that the intertwined relationship status of many 
participants in SEMs is what makes conflicts involving the SEM so 
hard: he was afraid to raise the ire of the person who invited him to 
 
 119. Kassan & Orsi, Legal Landscape, supra note 11, at 13–14 (claiming that existing laws 
assume dichotomous and clearly defined relationships as opposed to fluid, collaborative ones).  
 120. ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 86–95 (discussing the 
need for communication to facilitate effective group sharing and how to communicate 
effectively in different situations). 
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be part of this “cool, new thing,” but the person who invited him is 
now the one preventing it from being a cool, new thing.
121
  
As previously mentioned, relationships between SEM participants 
as well as the participants’ roles within the SEM are difficult to 
define. Someone may own the land on which a community garden (a 
circular borrowing enterprise) grows, but who owns the vegetables? 
Are they owned by the person who planted them? How about the 
person who watered the plants every day, all summer? Does the 
person who discovers a particular ripe vegetable and picks it, own it? 
And if anyone can pick the vegetables, who is responsible for 
watering them? What incentive does the person tasked with watering 
have to care for something that will not benefit her? Is it the person 
who reaps the reward of these assets that also bears the risk if 
something goes awry? In SEMs, it can be hard to determine which 
existing laws and contractual arrangements govern these relationships 
when the parties do not inhabit traditional, power-based roles.
122
  
Moreover, the success of a SEM sometimes depends on users’ 
trust of each other without a previously existing relationship. In part 
because of the explosion of online communication means like 
Facebook and Twitter, the average consumer has become much more 
comfortable self-disclosing to strangers, trusting that the consumer 
will still be relatively safe after self-disclosure.
123
 Similarly, SEMs 
rely on this willingness to trust others with whom we have little or no 
previous relationship.
124
 For example, Dave relies on Cindy to 
provide quality childcare, though their only relationship with one 
another is that they are both members of a TimeBank. This requires a 
high amount of trust based on relatively limited data. 
Similar to the way that drivers trust one another to stay in their 
lanes because doing so benefits everyone, SEMs rely on common 
norms, standards of behavior, and principles to form expectations for 
 
 121. Interview with Anonymous Co-Working Space User, supra note 109. 
 122. ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra note 13, at 13–14. 
 123. Derek Carey et al., Working Paper, Self-disclosure on Social Networking Sites, 
Worcester Polytechnical Institute 16 (2011), available at http://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/E-project/ 
Available/E-project-030112-142437/unrestricted/Self_Disclosure_IQP_Paper_Redacted.pdf.  
 124. Benkler, supra note 15, at 333–34. 
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one another’s behavior.
125
 Yet there are no “SEM police” to enforce 
these group norms. Moreover, tensions may arise within a SEM 
because the norms are not explicit, whether as a part of a written 
agreement or otherwise, but rather implicit in people’s interactions. 
Unlike a community barn-raising norm, which people in the 
community would have likely learned in childhood, participants in 
SEMs come and go frequently enough that implicit norms may not be 
sufficient to regulate behavior.  
2. Extensive Impact of Conflicts 
Another common thread in these borrowing conflicts is that the 
joint ownership/usership model inherent in many SEMs results in 
many participants feeling the impact of a conflict rather than only 
those participants directly involved. When Tiffany rents space in a 
commissary kitchen, her relationships with other renters are 
impacted, positively or negatively, by each renters’ concurrent, even 
if asynchronous, use. Thus, the success of each of these otherwise 
independent food businesses is somewhat dependent upon the other 
renters following group norms, getting out of the kitchen on time, and 
cleaning up after themselves. Consider this relationship in contrast to 
renting an apartment in a multi-unit building: it is not just about a 
neighbor leaving garbage in the common hallway while you make 
your granola in your own kitchen, but it is about another user leaving 
garbage in the only space where you can make your granola. 
Even if a dispute is confined to two participants in a SEM, 
everyone in the SEM has greater incentive to find resolution than 
they would be in a traditional rental business.
126
 If you rent a carpet 
cleaner from your local hardware store and discover that the person 
who rented it before you broke the machine, you likely spend little 
time crafting your approach to the prior renter who broke the carpet 
cleaner. Instead, you probably take your concern to the hardware 
store, as the hardware store (or perhaps the company that supplies the 
 
 125. See generally Richard H. Adams, The Origin, Development, & Regulation of Norms, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).  
 126. See Benkler, supra note 15, at 333 (claiming that community sharing spaces are 
incubators for a group of people “enforcing against antisocial behavior”).  
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machines to the hardware store) has plenty of carpet cleaners. If not, 
perhaps the store will buy more carpet cleaners once the prior renter 
pays for the one he broke, and in the meantime, you will visit another 
business in town that rents carpet cleaners.  
However, in a small appliance library, you will care if a fellow 
library user breaks the community vacuum, whether or not you own 
the vacuum either in part or outright. A friend (and fellow library 
user) might want to use the library’s vacuum tonight and talks to you 
about how frustrated she is. Her purpose in being part of this library 
was that she could not afford to own and has no means to rent nice 
appliances like the high-end vacuum that is now inoperable. On your 
mind is the fact that this is the fourth time the vacuum-breaker has 
broken an appliance. In response, you engage in gossip with your 
friend about the vacuum-breaker; as a result, what began as a two-
person dispute could cycle out into the wider circle, impacting the 
collective goodwill and future willingness to share. Clearly, a 
community of participants in a close-knit model can more tangibly 
and powerfully feel the impacts of dyadic disputes than parties in a 
traditional, hierarchical context.
127
 Thus, participants are also 
invested in other participants’ efficient and effective resolution of 
disputes. Like when everyone in an office catches the same cold, 
everyone in a sharing economy can “catch” the symptoms of conflict. 
3. The Low Cost, High Value Nature of Disputes 
Due to the interpersonal nature of SEMs, disputes in SEMs are 
likely to arise over relatively low-dollar items or other matters of 
little financial consequence. The difficulty in attaching a meaningful 
financial valuation to these disputes may encourage many attorneys 
to dismiss the conflicts as silly or irrelevant. But to SEM participants, 
a low-dollar value does not necessarily equate to a low-value conflict. 
In interviews of SEM participants for the purposes of this Article, 
many participants stated that it was often the “little” things (like 
 
 127. Indeed, researchers have found that the attractiveness of sharing is correlated not only 
to the perceived cost and benefit to the individual, but to the individual’s perception of other 
users’ usage of the shared good or service. Cait Lamberton & Randall Rose, When is Ours 
Better than Mine? A Framework for Understanding and Altering Participation in Commercial 
Sharing Systems, J. MARKETING 109, 112 (2012).  
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someone feeding their child an extra cookie) that irked them the 
most.
128
 In a society where the egregiousness of one’s actions is often 
measured by the financial worth of the aggrieved party’s case, 
resolving these types of conflicts with traditional legal devices is a 
challenging, if not impossible, endeavor. In the case of the cookie, 
untangling the interests behind, “Why did you feed my child three 
cookies?” and helping parties resolve such a dispute will not a 
warrant court filings or even a formal arbitration or mediation 
procedure. In fact, many attorneys will not involve themselves in 
these type of disputes at all, coding the “emotional” nature of the 
disputes as “irrational” and therefore not worthy of an attorney’s 
attention. But not understanding, appreciating, and addressing these 
conflicts may sour relationships within the SEM and lead to larger 
conflicts in the future.
129
  
C. Beyond the Contract: Dispute Systems Design Recommendations 
In light of these characteristics shared by many SEMs and the 
impracticality of litigating individual disputes, we propose that 
attorneys who hope to assist SEMs to better manage and resolve their 
disputes should consider one of their roles to be that of a dispute 
systems designer.
130
 In doing so, the attorney can add greater value to 
the SEM than would otherwise be derived in a traditional lawyer-
client relationship and the attorney can better prepare the SEM to 
self-manage conflicts by creating a clear, systematic, and transparent 
process for the stakeholders to follow when future conflicts arise.
131
 
 
 128. See Joanna Gray, Toward a More Resilient Financial System, 36 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 
799, 815–16 (2012–2013) (citing collaborative consumption’s potential to “threaten the 
centrality of money in peoples’ lives as a means of constituting identity and connection”). 
 129. See generally ROGER FISHER & DANIEL SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON 3–10 (2005). 
 130. We acknowledge that attorneys who engage with SEMs will need to be mindful of the 
ethical rules to which attorneys are bound. To that end, attorneys working with SEMs will need 
to carefully identify any attorney-client relationships present, manage those relationships 
accordingly, and be mindful of potential conflicts of interest that may arise during the 
representation. Because the scope and nature of an attorney’s involvement with SEMs will vary 
greatly depending on many factors—including but not limited to the legal business structure of 
the SEM, the legal and non-legal services the attorney is providing to the SEM and its 
participants, and the relationship between the participants and the SEM—we will not address all 
of the implications of the ethical rules within this Article.  
 131. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 6–7. 
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This reduces the cost of conflict overall and builds the SEM’s 
capacity for self-determination,
132
 including self-determination in the 
design of dispute systems themselves, that will serve the SEM’s 
participants and mission well. 
Of course, attorneys cannot be all things to all people. When their 
expertise does not extend to a certain skill set (e.g., facilitating a 
consensus-building process), or when an ethical conflict may prevent 
the attorney from assuming certain roles (e.g., if the attorney is asked 
to mediate an internal dispute of her existing organizational client),
133
 
the attorney should refer clients to other professionals. Yet many 
attorneys unnecessarily limit their roles when working with clients, 
and in so doing, they do not maximize the good they can do for their 
clients.
134
  
Our recommendations are rooted in dispute systems design best 
practices, taking into account the ethical rules for attorneys and the 
myriad of skills attorneys can (or could, with further professional 
training) employ. The recommendations are not meant to be 
prescriptive for every SEM, in every circumstance. Rather, these 
recommendations are intended to shape the contours of processes 
and, perhaps as importantly, attorneys’ roles, in SEM dispute 
resolution. 
1. Meaningfully Engage Affected Stakeholders in Design Process 
Ethical dispute systems design seeks to incorporate the values and 
interests of stakeholders—including users, decision-makers, 
implementers, and interested third parties—when creating a 
 
 132. Self-determination is a core value of mediation, a practice often categorized under the 
dispute resolution umbrella. In mediation, the value of self-determination is defined as “the act 
of coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and informed 
choices as to process and outcome.” AAA, ABA& ACR, Model Standard of Conduct for 
Mediators, STANDARD 1 (2005), available at https://adr.org/aaa/ShowDF?doc=ADRSTG_ 
010409. 
 133. This would implicate the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.12 (2005). 
 134. Janelle Orsi, Cooperation Law for a Sharing Economy, YES MAG. (Sept. 23, 2010), 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/cooperation-law-for-a-sharing-economy [hereinafter 
Orsi, Cooperation Law] (discussing how lawyers are often hesitant to facilitate or collaborate at 
the same time they represent a client, but naming ways in which they may do so within ethical 
bounds).  
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system.
135
 We recommend that a SEM attorney incorporate these 
values and interests in two ways: first, by thoroughly gathering 
stakeholder input before designing a dispute system; and second, by 
involving stakeholders in the design of the dispute system itself. 
a. Attorney As Conflict Assessor  
Consistent with dispute systems design best practices, the initial 
step in designing a system is to identify the purpose(s) for the dispute 
system.
136
 To achieve this goal for traditional business models, an 
attorney typically communicates with the client and drafts a contract 
based on both the client’s wishes and the attorney’s legal knowledge. 
In a SEM dispute system, it is essential to gather stakeholder input 
for the system’s design, especially as SEMs tend to be “flatter” 
organizationally than traditional business models. Asking an 
infrequent user of a commissary kitchen to contribute their thoughts 
may seem unnecessary or even antithetical to an attorney’s standard 
process for legal drafting. But in order to create a dispute system that 
effectively addresses disputes that occur and honors the values of a 
SEM, an attorney must also engage participants other than the direct 
client contact.
137
  
To engage these participants, an attorney ought to conduct a 
stakeholder assessment, which is a data-gathering process that allows 
the attorney to understand, from the stakeholders’ perspectives, what 
conflicts typically occur in the SEM and how those conflicts are 
currently addressed.
138
 A stakeholder assessment also helps the 
attorney understand the goals and values that comprise the foundation 
of the SEM, which should be taken into account in any system 
design.  
This stakeholder assessment process could take many forms. 
Often, it will involve interviewing, surveying, or leading focus 
groups of stakeholders and mapping their interests in a dispute 
 
 135. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 69–98. 
 136. Id. at 74; ROGER FISHER & ALAN SHARP, GETTING IT DONE: HOW TO LEAD WHEN 
YOU’RE NOT IN CHARGE 43–59 (1999) [hereinafter FISHER & SHARP, GETTING IT DONE]. 
 137. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 70–73. 
 138. COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 105, at 96–97.  
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system.
139
 An attorney’s role is to pose helpful (not cross-
examination or only closed-ended) questions, listen deeply, and 
capture people’s interests.
140
 Some examples include: 
“Describe a dispute you have had with other users in the 
commissary kitchen.” 
“How was the dispute handled?” 
“What do you think was effective about how the dispute was 
handled? What could have been better?” 
“Did you feel prepared to handle it?”  
“How have you been impacted, if at all, by disputes beyond 
your own?” 
“How would you prefer disputes be handled? Why?” 
After asking these questions, the attorney can assess the conflicts and 
how they are managed, identifying shared, non-competing, and 
competing interests.  
The attorney can then share his findings with the stakeholders. By 
showing stakeholders the many common interests within the 
community—for instance, that the kitchen users all want to create a 
community that leads to more collaboration among users and within 
which they can develop their own business skills—attorneys will help 
the stakeholders begin the design phase on a positive footing.
141
 
Managing any competing interests discovered during the stakeholder 
assessment—for instance, if some kitchen users want Maureen to 
deal with all conflicts, whereas other users want her to intervene only 
if users cannot resolve conflict among themselves—is more 
challenging. We recommend the attorney acting as facilitator be 
transparent about the competing interests and clearly articulates how 
those competing interests will be addressed during the design phase.   
 
 139. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 91. 
 140. Id. at 360–63. 
 141. Id. at 74–79. 
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b. Attorney as Facilitator 
The next phase of creating a dispute system is to generate options 
for design features that meet the stakeholders’ interests. Attorneys 
may consider serving in a facilitative role to assist SEMs in 
addressing the different interests of their participants.
142
 This role 
offers SEMs a few benefits. First, one SEM participant suggested that 
an attorney employing facilitative, rather than directive, skills could 
deliver valuable assistance without the threat many SEM participants 
perceive that attorneys typically pose to a group’s self-determination 
and culture.
143
 Second, the facilitative attorney can help the SEM 
participants avoid the belief that all “opposing” parties’ interests are 
in direct opposition to the participants’ interests. In one study, this 
bias showed up in 68 percent of negotiations, even though the 
negotiators’ interests were aligned.
144
 The attorney can tease out for 
the SEM participants which interests are shared, non-competing, and 
competing, then direct their focus to finding ways to create value 
from these interests.
 
 
To engage in a facilitative role, the attorney can facilitate a 
brainstorming session or sessions with stakeholder groups around 
how a system might address the competing interests. Rather than an 
across-the-table, two-party negotiation, this facilitative platform can 
encourage creativity among the stakeholders. The attorney must 
design and conduct interest-based negotiations so that participants 
feel heard, are prepared to listen to one another, and in the end, can 
exercise self-determination.
145
 For instance, the attorney may send 
out an agenda before a community meeting that includes time for 
users to talk about why they are part of the kitchen, time for users to 
talk about successful conflict resolution experiences they have had 
outside the kitchen context, and time to discuss among each other 
 
 142. Orsi, Cooperation Law, supra note 134; ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND 
PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 370–75. 
 143. Interview with Anonymous TimeBank User, supra note 92.  
 144. See LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 74 (2011). 
 145. SAM KANER, FACILITATOR’S GUIDE TO PARTICIPATORY DECISION-MAKING xxii 
(2014). 
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what they have learned about the other users as a result of the 
discussion.
146
 
A facilitative role poses challenges, though not insurmountable 
ones, for attorneys who are used to the traditional advocacy role.
147
 
Certainly, the attorney may have questions:
148
 What is your 
professional obligation when facilitating a discussion among many 
client constituents? How should you guide the conversation if it 
proceeds in a direction that you know is not legally feasible? These 
questions are important to keep in mind, and smart design of the 
facilitated process will help the attorney stay within the attorney’s 
ethical obligations. Though the nuances of the ethical rules are 
outside the scope of this Article, generally speaking, attorneys are 
permitted to serve as facilitators: the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct permit an attorney to take on the role of a “third-party 
neutral,” so long as the attorney receives written permission from the 
client to do so
149
 and makes clear her role as neutral to those who 
participate in a discussion in which she facilitates.
150
 
Attorneys who serve as facilitators may add value for their clients 
in many ways. The facilitated conversation may directly serve the 
best interests of the client, especially if the interests include having 
 
 146. See, e.g., ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 
363–65. 
 147. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New 
Issues, No Answers From the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 407 (1997). 
 148. Orsi raises these questions and proposes that CCM attorneys look to collaborative law 
as a model for how to embrace multiple roles, including a facilitative role, as an attorney. Orsi, 
Cooperation Law, supra note 134. Collaborative law allows attorneys to represent individual 
clients while also working with the “other side” and the “other side’s” attorney to come to a 
mutually agreeable and value-creating resolution. Some states have adopted the Uniform 
Collaborative Law Act to ease concerns that attorneys may be abdicating their duty to zealously 
advocate for their clients’ best interests by working with, instead of against, the other side. See 
UNI. COLLAB. LAW ACT 1 (2010), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title= Collaborative+ 
Law+Act. Techniques and skills used include interest-based negotiation and mediation. Id. at 
2–4. If the case results in a court trial, the collaborative law attorneys end representation and the 
parties hire litigation attorneys. Id. at 57–58. 
 149. MODEL R. PROF’L. CONDUCT, R. 1.12(a) (2013); see ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra 
note 13, at 80-89 (discussing how to obtain informed consent for non-traditional attorney roles). 
 150. MODEL R. PROF’L. CONDUCT, R. 2.4(b) (2013); see ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra 
note 13, at 89–93 (distinguishing between the role of a mediator [which is likely not permitted 
by the Rules] and the role of a facilitator [which is permitted by the Rules]). 
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SEM participants vested in the SEMs’ dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The attorney can also call on his knowledge of past 
conflicts to ask good questions of the group, perhaps avoiding the 
types of conflicts that result in litigation due to a lack of thoughtful 
discussion at the genesis of a contract. 
In addition, many of the skills attorneys employ—clear 
communication, integration of ideas, understanding how humans’ 
diverse needs and emotions impact a group challenge—are part of the 
skill set of good facilitators.
151
 Of course, not all attorneys can 
facilitate well; their tendency to advocate may prevail. Unfortunately, 
if this reversion occurred during the facilitative process, it would only 
confirm some of the fears SEM participants have expressed about 
involving attorneys in SEM business: “Once attorneys get involved, 
there’s a fear they’ll run the show.”
152
 For that reason, the attorney 
would be wise to refer the SEM to someone else for this role if she 
has not been trained in facilitation.  
Another advantage to the attorney facilitating a norms discussion 
is that if she has spent time developing relationships with the 
members of the community through the assessment phase, she can be 
seen as both a trusted insider and an unbiased party. With the 
appropriate facilitation, the participants can view themselves as the 
experts on the SEMs’ cultures and the attorney as the expert on 
process.
153
 The attorney can use trust to encourage participants to 
share their opinions and test ideas; question values; and play the 
devils’ advocate, if needed.
154
 For instance, the attorney may pose, 
“So I’m hearing a lot about not having time to deal with conflicts as 
they occur. I’m wondering: how much time does it take to deal with 
conflict later? What options might there be for addressing conflict 
that would not take much time at the outset?”  
 
 151. Orsi, Cooperation Law, supra note 134. Indeed, HNMCP has created a course to help 
new attorneys further develop these skills. HARVARD NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION CLINICAL 
PROGRAM, The Lawyer as Facilitator Workshop, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/the-
lawyer-as-facilitator-workshop/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 152. Interview with Anonymous TimeBank User, supra note 92. 
 153. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 86–89. 
 154. FISHER & SHARP, GETTING IT DONE, supra note 136, at 83–85. 
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c. Attorney as Distinguisher and Drafter 
Still another advantage to the attorney facilitating a stakeholder 
discussion about a dispute resolution mechanism is that the attorney 
will hear first-hand the concerns underlying the community 
members’ interests, can reframe so that everyone hears the 
concerns,
155
 and can draft norms and a contract with those concerns 
in mind. After the stakeholder discussion, the attorney can parse what 
she heard into two (or more) categories: for example, what belongs in 
a commissary kitchen user contract and what is better articulated in 
norms or guidelines that will be posted and shared among users and 
regularly referenced in community meetings.
156
 The attorney can 
later return drafts of any contracts and norms to the group for 
comment and revision.  
Under the right circumstances, and after the group has identified 
the decision-makers, the group can then undertake a consensus-
building
157
 or other type of collaborative process
158
 to approve the 
contract and group norms. These processes—from stakeholder 
assessment through final commitment documents—may take longer 
than the traditional path from client interview to final documents, but 
the documents created will better reflect the specific community’s 
needs and values and will therefore be more likely to be used. 
Participatory processes lead to greater buy-in to the systems thereby 
created.
159
 
2. Build In Conflict Engagement as Regular Part of SEM Culture 
One of the purposes of having an attorney facilitate the overall 
stakeholder engagement process could be to set an example of how 
skilled, inclusive facilitation could be utilized for future SEM 
meetings at which conflict is addressed. The attorney can encourage 
 
 155. ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra note 13, at 93. 
 156. See infra Recommendation 4–5. 
 157. See, e.g., ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 87–100; see 
generally LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS-BUILDING HANDBOOK: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REACHING AGREEMENT (1999). 
 158. ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 114. 
 159. See generally COSTANTINO & MERCHANT, supra note 105, at 49–66. 
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participants to make addressing issues a regular part of community 
meetings by helping the community create practices and norms for 
those meetings. For instance, the attorney for Dave’s TimeBank 
could create a template agenda for each community meeting that 
covers the following issues: 
1. Review of Agenda and Member Additions 
2. Words of Gratitude from the Last Month of TimeBanking 
3. Focus on a Group Norm: Timely Communication When  
Giving/Receiving Time 
4. Challenges Related to the Group Norm 
5. Potential Ways to Manage Challenges 
6. Member Additions 
7. Announcements  
8. Closing 
A standard agenda, like the one above, serves a few purposes.
160
 
First, it helps members like Dave know what to expect at each 
meeting and anticipate a time when he can address his issue with the 
lack of childcare standards. Having a standing agenda for community 
meetings that includes time to talk about grievances as a community 
signals to the group that conflict management is a normal part of how 
a community lives together. If participants hear the message that the 
SEM wants participants to raise issues early and often, conflict 
management will become part of institutional culture and make 
conflict harder to avoid.
161
  
Second, once members know what to expect at a meeting, they 
may find it easier to rotate meeting facilitation duties, thus 
distributing more broadly the role of setting the table to discuss, and 
 
 160. For a general guide to creating agendas that reflect group purpose and have a clear 
process, see KANER, supra note 145, at 145–96. See also ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING 
SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 111–13. 
 161. Interview with an Anonymous Co-Working Space User, supra note 99.  
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generate ideas for solving, problems.
162
 It may take some time for the 
community to engage in regular conflict discussions. Until then, the 
early adopters may be seen as tattle-tales because they are taking the 
risk of naming dynamics or problems that no one has yet named.
163
 
No one should be punished in a community for raising issues, and the 
attorney can help the community decide how to systematically 
process complaints so that no complaint goes unaddressed simply 
because it comes from a “complainer.”
164
 
Third, a standard agenda that includes time to discuss conflicts 
gives people space to remind each other about group norms, offer 
coaching to one another, and help each other resolve user-user 
conflicts. Dave may raise the childcare issue in the meeting, and 
Cindy may be surprised and react strongly. In a context in which the 
two were alone, this may become a heated argument. But in a 
community context, the fellow users may be able to ask questions, 
share perspectives, acknowledge what is happening for each of them, 
and mediate the user-user conflict to some degree. Raising issues in 
person, together, may make the community stronger than it would be 
if issues were never raised.
165
   
 
 162. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERTS’ RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR 
MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS 84–85 (2006). Before instituting rotating 
facilitation duties, the attorney should help the SEM think through the collateral effects of 
members raising issues in institutional settings, e.g., whether the SEM is prepared to be “on 
notice” about particular issues, whether the SEM has an obligation to respond to all issues that 
might be raised, etc. This concern was aptly raised by participants at the scholarship roundtable 
on Social Entrepreneurship, Community Lawyering & Dispute Resolution at the Washington 
University School of Law in the Fall of 2014. See also ROGER SCHWARTZ, THE SKILLED 
FACILITATOR 320–22 (2002) (discussing the potential for conflicts when an interested party 
performs the role of a facilitator and how to manage those conflicts). 
 163. Macolm Gladwell explores the concept of Early Adopters, risk-taking, and negative 
perceptions the majority of a community has about Early Adopters in his book, THE TIPPING 
POINT 197–99 (2000).  
 164. In this way, the attorney can serve the function of what Gladwell calls a Salesman, 
one who simplifies and translates a new or challenging concept in a way that makes sense to the 
hearer, so the majority is more likely to adopt the concept or practice. Id. at 199–200.  
 165. Schwartz, supra note 162, at 24. 
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3. Increase Capacity Among Members to Manage Conflict 
Themselves 
Beyond building institutional norms around ongoing conflict 
management, an attorney can help SEM stakeholders increase their 
capacity to manage conflict among themselves.
166
 Especially when 
ongoing relationships are in play, the incentive to deflect, avoid, or 
tolerate conflict is high.
167
 Yet, unaddressed conflicts that underlie 
relationships and communities tend to flare up in other ways: passive 
aggressive behavior among users,
168
 gossip, users departing without 
saying why,
169
 and failure of the common purpose. A key to creating 
a culture of conflict engagement is helping individual users skillfully 
navigate the tension between empathy and assertiveness so that 
conflict can be both acknowledged and worked through.
170
 
To help community members feel more prepared to raise issues as 
they occur, the SEM can arrange for the members to be trained in 
interest-based negotiation,
171
 including how to have difficult 
conversations.
172
 For instance, when Tiffany joined the commissary 
kitchen, she could have received a certificate to attend a local conflict 
resolution center’s training as a welcome gift. In these trainings, 
members could practice addressing conflicts similar to those they will 
face in the SEM. For instance, Tiffany could have practiced having a 
difficult conversation with a neighbor who parks in her yard or a 
former co-worker who left loose papers all over the copy room. An 
alternative would be to “train the trainers,” so that when Luis, Ralph, 
or Tiffany leave the commissary kitchen community, there is still a 
core group of participants who can continue upholding the norm that 
community members should raise issues and resolve disputes among 
members as soon as they arise.  
 
 166. See ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 107.  
 167. See DOUGLAS STONE, BRUCE PATTON, & SHEILA HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS 
xxvii-xxix (2010). 
 168. Interview with an Anonymous Commissary Kitchen Manager, supra note 106. 
 169. Interview with an Anonymous Co-Working Space User, supra note 99.  
 170. MNOOKIN, PEPPET & TULUMELLO, supra note 100, at 44–50. 
 171. See generally FISHER, WILLIAM & PATTON, GETTING TO YES, supra note 17, at 58–
65. 
 172. See generally STONE, PATTON, & HEEN, DIFFICULT CONVERSATIONS, supra note 167. 
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Having community-wide competency in conflict resolution skills 
keeps the cost of conflict low, as people who feel prepared to address 
conflict are more likely to manage it themselves before escalating 
issues to a manager or third party. Regular training also gives people 
a common language with which to manage group process and 
difficult conversations in the future.
173
 For instance, after training at a 
local conflict regulation center, Tiffany may better understand the 
negative impact resulting from going to Luis about her problem 
instead of directly addressing the problem with Ralph and therefore 
choose a different course of action. Training also builds problem-
solving capacity within the membership that will serve the SEM well 
in other situations that require initiative and creativity. For example, 
if Maureen, in her role as the commissary kitchen manager, has a 
conflict with the City Council over zoning for commissary kitchens, 
she may feel more comfortable bringing the issue to her conflict-
competent users and asking for them to brainstorm approaches she 
may take to negotiating in the commissary kitchen’s best interests. 
4. Help SEMs Distinguish Between Legal Obligations and Norms 
In the TimeBank example, the TimeBank had a set of user 
guidelines and core values it expected members to follow. Clearly 
articulating these core values (the foundational beliefs on which the 
SEM is based) and guidelines (the process for being part of the SEM) 
are essential to creating substantive community standards by which 
behavior can be evaluated. But general core values such as, “Good 
will, respect for self and others, and the desire to build a network of 
support, care and trust will make us strong,”
174
 do not articulate a 
process for evaluating behavior or enforcing community values.  
Attorneys are uniquely skilled to be able to distinguish between 
what might work best as a “law,” an administrative rule, and a 
generally less-enforceable principle or norm.
175
 What attorneys 
 
 173. Schwartz, supra note 162, at 165. 
 174. Guide to Trading, TIME TRADE CIRCLE, http://www.timetradecircle.org/members.php 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2014). 
 175. Orsi, Cooperation Law, supra note 134. For a discussion of SEMs’ use of these 
various forms of regulation, see ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 
121–22.  
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sometimes do not understand is how valuable group norms can be, 
even if legally unenforceable, especially for mitigating the effects of 
disputes that could eventually rise to the level of legal 
enforceability.
176
 Attorneys can provide a valuable service to SEMs 
by helping them distinguish what fits in each of these buckets: 
overarching community values, standards of behavior, instructions 
for being a user, legal obligations, and dispute management 
processes. After the stakeholder engagement process, the attorney 
can do some behind-the-table work categorizing interests based on 
the purpose of each of these buckets. Values can go into the 
TimeBank’s mission or vision statement. Standards of behavior can 
be included in a group expectation list to which all TimeBank 
participants must assent. Participants should be encouraged to discuss 
any additional standards related to a particular exchange (e.g., for 
Dave’s children’s care) when the participants arrange to exchange 
goods or services with each other. General instructions for TimeBank 
users can go in the instruction manual, perhaps in conjunction with 
the standards of behavior. Legal obligations can be included in a brief 
contract between users signed at the time of joining or, if each 
circumstance is sufficiently different, for each separate service they 
give or receive.
177
 And dispute management processes can be clearly 
articulated, using the same language, in the general instructions, at 
the end of the standards of behavior, and in other member fora.
178
 
The distinctions between laws, administrative rules, and 
enforceable principles or norms are critical to creating appropriate 
dispute resolution processes. Not everything needs to be part of a 
community contract or set of norms, but merely mentioning values 
and standards as a way of orienting the user to the SEM is not 
sufficient for a user to understand how the standards are enforced. 
 
 176. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, BREAKING ROBERTS’ RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR 
MEETING, BUILD CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS 83, App. B (2006). 
 177. Because some norms, rules, or other terms of operation important to a SEM may not 
be legally enforceable, it is important to apportion these concepts appropriately between legal 
and non-legal documents. See Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential 
Role of Courts for Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2178–79 (2013–2014) (many 
terms that are negotiated among participants in innovative businesses are not enforceable in a 
court of law).  
 178. See infra Recommendation 5. 
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Once the community interests are captured and categorized, the 
attorney can set out to identify those behaviors that must or should be 
captured in a legally-binding contract between users and the SEM, or 
among users. Then, the attorney can ask how the group would like to 
enforce other norms. Though the norms may not be legally binding, 
the attorney can provide a helpful service in facilitating the group’s 
discussions about how to enforce them, asking questions about 
fairness and consistency of the processes the group proposes, and 
scribing the system upon which the group decides. The attorney can 
ensure the group has thought about various pieces of a system: 
communication routes for conflicts to enter the system, what 
information is needed to begin a conflict resolution process, what 
happens once a conflict has entered the system, whether and how 
consent to participate is determined, who oversees the system, and 
what happens with the results once a conflict is resolved.
179
  
5. Communicate Norms and Processes in Variety of Ways 
SEM participants should know about group norms and understand 
the processes by which the community enforces those norms. This is 
important not only while a person is a participant in the SEM, but 
also before a person becomes a participant. As one participant in a 
shared working space articulated to us, technology can assist a SEM 
to make norms a regular part of the community, whether on the 
website, in an online internal wiki,
180
 in a moving display in a shared 
space, or on people’s individual tech devices. Tiffany would have 
benefitted enormously from having an easily-accessible tool, perhaps 
a phone app or clearly-displayed artistic rendering of the norms, to 
help her navigate her conflict with Ralph, rather than calling a friend 
to complain.  
 
 179. See generally WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETT & STEPHEN GOLDBERG, GETTING 
DISPUTES RESOLVED (1993) (outlining these practical considerations for any dispute system). 
 180. A “wiki” is a generic term for “server software that allows users to freely create and 
edit Web page content using any Web browser.” The most famous wiki is Wikipedia, the 
“online encyclopedia” that allows users to create and edit entries. Wikis can be used internally 
in organizations to communicate and update important information. Ward Cunningham, What is 
Wiki? (June 27, 2002), http://www.wiki.org/wiki.cgi?WhatIsWiki.  
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The attorney can also help the community create an orientation 
process that involves a discussion of community norms rather than 
simply distributing norms on a piece of paper or in an email. Ralph, 
as well as all the other users, could have provided input or 
perspective on the norms and would have been more likely to 
remember them because of it.
181
 If the SEM is amenable and well-
humored, the attorney may consider creating a role playing exercise, 
short examples, or catchy phrases for how the community norms 
work in practice. This makes the norms a living, and often fun, part 
of the community.  
The attorney can also work with the SEM to establish a regular 
norm review process. The commissary kitchen, for example, will 
change with every new participant, so though a regular review takes 
time, it is worth it for Maureen and the users to check in with one 
another periodically to determine whether the norms, which are the 
foundation of this system, still fit the community.
182
 Norms that are 
set in stone through a contract, bylaws, or other more formal 
codification may be difficult to change. In contrast, a consensus-
building and attorney drafting process could be used every month, 
year, or two years to review the norms, depending on how rapidly the 
community shifts. 
6. Identify Person or Persons Responsible for Community 
Engagement and Dispute Resolution 
One of the challenges faced by SEMs in which all members are 
considered equals is that the community rarely designates one person, 
or even a defined subset of people, to manage disputes. All members 
being equal in value within the SEM does not mean that every 
member must be equal in role.
183
 Though Dave, Cindy, and other 
users want to be treated with the same amount of respect (their hours 
count equally, after all), reliance on all users to be a part of resolving 
all complaints does not honor people’s unique skills. Neither is such a 
 
 181. FISHER & SHARP, GETTING IT DONE, supra note 136, at 148. 
 182. See Benkler, supra note 15, at 310 & n.91. 
 183. FISHER & SHARP, GETTING IT DONE, supra note 136, at 143–52; ORSI & DOSKOW, 
THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 61–64. 
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system efficient; no one wants to be forced to be a community 
mediator or investigator, and involving everyone in every conflict 
would drag out conflict for far too long. A point person for internal 
conflict would help the situation in which “no one is there to set forth 
rules in confident manner, because everyone [is] heads down with 
their work.”
184
 
This designated person need not be solely dedicated to conflict 
resolution; in fact, that would not make sense in smaller 
communities. Rather, the designated person (or persons) could be in 
charge of community engagement, as a Workbar co-working space in 
Boston did recently with a shift from a receptionist to a “Space and 
Community Manager.”
185
 The person in this role can be in charge of 
educating new participants about the group norms, helping 
participants build skills to manage issues themselves (whether as a 
trainer
186
 or coach
187
), organizing events and setting agendas for 
community meetings, and, if needed, managing disputes that arise.
188
 
By designating such a person—thereby moving beyond a SEM 
simply proclaiming on its website that it cares about building a sense 
of community among the participants—the SEM demonstrates its 
seriousness about creating and maintaining a healthy community.
189
 
Beyond appointing a designated person to manage community 
engagement, a SEM must be conscientious about who is designated 
to manage escalating conflicts. For instance, if the group decides that 
mediation is one of the steps in the dispute resolution system,
190
 the 
designated mediator should be trained in mediation and have 
experience mediating actual conflicts before doing so in the SEM. A 
 
 184. Telephone Interview with Co-Working Space User, supra note 109. 
 185. Locations, WORKBAR, http://workbar.com/locations/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 186. Any person who seeks to train others in dispute resolution skills should have first 
received extensive training themselves. Dispute resolution—and teaching dispute resolution—is 
a professional field with a particular set of skills and it should not be assumed that someone 
who has taken one training is prepared to then train others.  
 187. See, e.g., Conflict Management Coaching Model, AIRFORCE, http://www.adr.af.mil/ 
services/cmc/index.asp.  
 188. This role is similar to, though not exactly like, an ombudsperson in the corporate or 
university context. 
 189. Interview with Co-Working Space User, supra note 109. 
 190. ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 108 (expressing a 
preference for mediation as the best way to resolve SEM disputes). 
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facilitative mediation style
191
 would likely best preserve self-
determination within the group and empower the people involved in 
the conflict to discuss the important aspects of the conflict.
192
 
The chosen mediator must be trusted by most, if not all, members. 
This need for trust may dictate that a rotating group of community 
members, rather than one person, is responsible for filling the role. A 
rotating appointment alleviates individual members from having to 
take on substantial roles other than that for which they initially 
agreed to fill and ensures a variety of opinions inform the 
community’s conflict resolution processes.  
7. Consider Implications of Confidentiality and Transparency 
Though confidentiality and transparency are often seen in tension 
with one another, a dispute systems designer sees them as two ways 
of meeting community interests related to openness.
193
 While calls 
for a decision-making process to be “totally transparent” often come 
from stakeholders (either internal or external) who want to ensure 
such processes (and more often, the outcomes) are thorough and fair, 
one of the roles of an attorney is to help a SEM understand the 
advantages and disadvantages to having all information about 
community norms and processes be available to the public, or even to 
all community members.
194
  
On one hand, publicly available community norms and processes 
for conflict management help those seeking to join the SEM evaluate 
whether—and if so, how—they want to participate in the SEM. With 
respect to the actual substance of conflicts and their resolution, 
however, attorneys may add some legal wisdom to discussions about 
whether—and if so, how—to share the actual substance of conflicts 
and their resolution. In some cases, confidential processes and 
outcomes help parties be more candid, save face with the public or 
 
 191. For more information on the variety of types of mediation, see Leonard L. Riskin, 
Understanding Mediator Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
1 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 7 (1996). 
 192. Contra ORSI & DOSKOW, THE SHARING SOLUTION, supra note 40, at 109. 
 193. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 179–83. 
 194. Id. at 183–86. 
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other constituencies outside the primary decision-making process,
195
 
brainstorm more creative options, include diverse perspectives that 
may not be publicly popular, engage in self-determination, and 
ultimately more efficiently and thoroughly resolve a dispute.
196
 On 
the other hand, transparency creates precedent, respects the self-
determination and autonomy of group members, provokes ongoing 
and sometimes helpful conversation about conflict, and provides a 
check against misuse of the system.
197
 The attorney can help create 
rules around confidentiality and transparency that reflect the SEM’s 
stakeholders’ interests. The attorney can also help the SEM decide 
what discussions or decisions should be shared with all participants, 
which should be shared only with those in the conflict, and which 
should be reserved for only the ultimate decision-makers in an 
organization.  
8. Be Thoughtful About Purpose of a Contract 
Due to the intimacy typically inherent in the relationship between 
participants in a SEM, parties may not readily refer to a contract 
when negotiating the terms of their involvement with one another or 
navigating disputes.
198
 This is not to say that contracts are not 
important to SEMs; to the contrary, contracts are especially important 
to SEMs, as the small and less formal nature of their activities means 
that no applicable statutes may exist, and case law may not be easily 
applied to the facts at hand.
199
 Moreover, a well-written contract can 
serve as a last-resort safeguard against unwelcome outcomes in 
 
 195. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO 105–129 (1993).  
 196. ROGERS ET AL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES, supra note 38, at 180–83. 
 197. Id.  
 198. Interview with Co-Working Space User, supra note 109. 
 199. Erin O’Hara O’Connor & Christopher R. Drahozal, The Essential Role of Courts for 
Supporting Innovation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2177, 2178–80 (2013–2014) (reasoning that lack of 
existing business norms, a commitment to avoiding litigation, and the existence of agreements 
that would be unenforceable in the courts are why studies have shown that innovative 
businesses tend to rely on lawyers and contracts more so than their traditional counterparts.). 
See also Matthew C. Jennejohn, Contract Adjudication in a Collaborative Economy, 5 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 173, 201 (2010–2011) (noting that courts’ interest in the customs of the parties to the 
contract and industry norms, both of which are often inapplicable to innovative, collaborative 
relationships, lead many collaborators to eschew the court system in favor of contractual 
dispute escalation procedures that end in arbitration).  
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court.
200
 If existing standard contracts or certain well-worn 
provisions can be applied readily to a SEM and the terms are 
understood by the participants, the attorney need not draft a contract 
from scratch. The attorney may trust that, should the arrangement 
ever need to be litigated, the language will be familiar to 
adjudicators.  
However, due to the intentionally flexible roles that exist within 
SEMs, participants may eventually adjust their relationship and 
performance in ways that are not specifically contemplated by the 
contract, which can result in conflicts for which few legal rights and 
no resolution has been contemplated.
201
 To account for such 
evolution in relationship, it is important to memorialize intent, 
purpose, and agreement to negotiate in good faith over finer details as 
they arise in such an agreement.
202
 The attorney can also articulate, 
both to the participants as well as within the documents themselves, a 
clear relationship between the contract and the other documents, such 
as the community norms, which may contain more complex dispute 
resolution procedures.
203
 Attorneys for SEMs must be creative, 
thorough, and well-informed of the needs and potential conflicts of 
the SEM when drafting a contract for its use, since the contract itself 
may provide the only suitable dispute resolution mechanism for 
resolving conflicts that arise under the contract. 
As our analysis of collaborative consumption demonstrates, more 
research and practice-based advice must emerge in response to the 
emergence of CCMs. Attempts to categorize, explain, and probe 
these models will continue, and we hope we have added value in our 
own attempt.  
When we deconstruct some of today’s most innovative 
businesses—Uber, Airbnb, and the like—and the very public disputes 
 
 200. O’Hara O’Connor & Drahozal, supra note 202, at 2179.  
 201. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854 (1977–1978) 
(addressing the need for flexibility to be built into contracts to accommodate potential changes 
in parties’ relationships and performance in the future).  
 202. Id.  
 203. See generally ORSI, PRACTICING LAW, supra note 13, at 95–114 (discussing how to 
shape agreements governed by both “social expectation” and important “legal” terms that leave 
“windows for negotiation” among community members). 
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in which these businesses are involved, we see that many CCMs are 
re-packaged market-based solutions and can thus often turn to 
existing laws and legal strategies as a starting point to resolving their 
disputes. Though attorneys who serve these businesses will do well to 
learn more about CCMs and anticipate the disputes the businesses 
will face (specifically around regulatory issues), we believe the real 
innovation in attorney-led dispute systems design for CCMs will 
happen in those innovative models that truly evidence a “sharing” 
mindset among their participants.  
The true sharing economy requires a new kind of lawyer, one who 
is willing to embrace the role of dispute systems designer and wear 
multiple hats as that role dictates: stakeholder assessor, consensus 
builder, drafter, facilitator, process architect, and group advisor, as 
well as others yet to be identified. As the sharing economy grows, 
attorneys and clinical instructors who teach future attorneys must be 
willing to learn and grow, adopting new skills and practicing 
modified roles in the service of these innovative clients.  
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